Posts Tagged: "Judge Kara Stoll"

Berkheimer is also equally important, if not more important, because it stands for the proposition that questions of fact can and do underline patent eligibility determinations. This is important not only because it will make summary judgment more difficult for infringers, but because if there are questions of fact underneath the patent eligibility determination it should be exceptionally difficult (if not virtually impossible) for district courts to dismiss patent infringement complaints using FRCP 12(b)(6). This is true because under FRCP 12(b)(6) all facts asserted in the complaint by the plaintiff (i.e., the patent owner) are taken as true and dismissal appropriate only where there can be no victory by the plaintiff even based on the facts plead in the complaint.

Exmark Manufacturing was awarded $24 million in compensatory damages after a jury found that Briggs and Stratton infringed Exmark’s patent on a lawn mower with improved flow control baffles. The award was doubled by the court, after a finding that Briggs and Stratton’s infringement was willful. On appeal, Briggs challenged six holdings: (1) summary judgment that claim 1 was not anticipated or obvious; (2) denial of summary judgment that claim 1 is indefinite; (3) denial of a new trial on damages; (4) evidentiary rulings related to damages; (5) denial of a new trial on willfulness; and, (6) denial of Brigg’s laches defense. The Federal Circuit vacated findings of willfulness and the underlying damages award, remanding to the trial court.

In re Brunetti, the Federal Circuit reversed a Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) decision affirming a refusal to register the mark “FUCT” because it comprised immoral or scandalous matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (“Section 2(a)”). While the Board properly relied on substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the bar against registering immoral or scandalous marks was held to be an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.

On December 8, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. (2016-2442) that provides some useful language to practitioners dealing with patent ineligibility rejections having Alice as their basis… “Like the claims at issue in Mortgage Grader, the [claims at issue] are directed to an ‘economic arrangement’ implemented using ‘generic computer technology.’ These issues were significant, if not determinative, of the Court’s holding in Alice.”

In Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Rec. Prods., after unsuccessfully defending a patent infringement lawsuit, Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. (“BRP”) appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. BRP argued that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,568,969 (“the ‘969 patent”) and 6,793,545 (“the ‘545 patent”) were obvious, that patentee Arctic Cat failed to mark patented products, that the jury based its royalty award on improper expert testimony, and that BRP did not willfully infringe the asserted claims. BRP also appealed the district court’s award of treble damages and the ongoing royalty to Artic Cat… While the burden of persuasion under the statute is always on the patentee… the alleged infringer who challenges the patentee’s compliance with the marking statute has the initial burden of production because placing the burden on the patentee “could lead to a large-scale fishing expedition.”

In Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees in the lower court because “following the Alice decision, IH’s claims were objectively without merit.”  Alice issued two months after the filing of suit.

Because it is clear when infringement occurs, and the scope of the claims is reasonably certain, the Court reversed the judgment of invalidity due to indefiniteness… Claims having functional elements are not indefinite, as encompassing both an apparatus and a method, if they make clear whether infringement occurs upon creating the apparatus or upon its use. A claim with functional language clearly tied to a structure that defines its capabilities is an apparatus claim; such functional language does not make the claim indefinite by also claiming a method of use.

In re Cray, Inc., the Federal Circuit applied the recent Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision to grant a writ of mandamus, directing the Eastern District of Texas to transfer Raytheon’s patent case to a proper venue. The district court refused the transfer based on notions of targeting the district for a benefit, according to a four-part test it adapted from In re Cordis Corp. The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the listed criteria were not sufficiently tethered to the relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)… In determining venue in a patent infringement case, the location of defendant’s employees who work from home is not a regular and established place of defendant’s business when the defendant corporation has no material connection to that place, as by rent, inventory, conditioning employment based on the location, or other relevant facts.

The dispute arose from a Mexican patent infringement suit between Stellar and two of Allied’s Mexican distributors. Allied manufactures the products accused of infringement in the United States, which are then sold in Mexico by Allied’s Mexican’s distributors. Allied sells the same product in the United States under a different name… For a patent dispute to be an actual controversy, the courts look at affirmative actions taken by the patentee, communication between the parties, the relevant litigation history, and the relationship between any foreign suits and the US parties and patents. Assertion of a foreign patent against foreign distributors does not per se create an actual controversy, for declaratory judgment, regarding infringement of a corresponding US patent by a US manufacturer.

Uber Technologies, Inc. and Ottomotto LLC (“Uber”), appealed the district court’s order, denying Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of pending litigation with Waymo, LLC (“Waymo”). Levandowski, a former employee of Waymo, was an Intervenor in this case. Uber sought to compel arbitration on the basis of Waymo’s arbitration agreement with Levandowski, not because of any arbitration agreement with Waymo.

Waymo, a Google spin-off, sued Uber and Ottomotto for patent infringement and violations of federal and state trade secret laws. Waymo alleged that its former employee, Mr. Levandowski, improperly downloaded documents on Waymo’s driverless vehicle technology prior to leaving the company and founding Ottomotto, which was subsequently acquired by Uber… During discovery, the Magistrate Judge granted Waymo’s Motion to Compel production of the Stroz Report. Waymo subpoenaed Stroz to produce the report and accompanying communications, documents, and devices. After a Motion to Quash was denied, Levandowski, Ottomotto, and Uber filed Motions for Relief from the Magistrate’s orders. The District Court denied the Motions. Acting alone, Mr. Levandowski appealed the district court’s denial of relief. Because the orders were not appealable final judgments, Mr. Levandowski presented his appeal as a writ of mandamus. The Court denied the writ, dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and ordered production of the Report.

After briefly parsing the statutory language of §1400(b) critical to the decision the Federal Circuit concluded that Judge Gilstrap’s four-factor test was not compliant with the statutory language. Judge Lourie simply concluded: “The district court’s four-factor test is not sufficiently tethered to this statutory language and thus it fails to inform each of the necessary requirements of the statute.”… “The fact that Cray allowed its employees to work from the Eastern District of Texas is insufficient,” wrote Judge Lourie as he shifted to the specifics of the case before the Court.

In Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp., a district court dismissed a patent infringement complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, because the patent was drawn to patent ineligible subject matter. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the patent “claims an improvement to computer memory systems and is not directed to an abstract idea.” Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The majority determined that the patent claims drawn to a computer memory system did not cover an abstract idea and, therefore, the second step of the Alice test was an unnecessary inquiry… “Our review of the ’740 patent claims demonstrates that they are directed to an improved computer memory system, not to the abstract idea of categorical data storage,” Judge Stoll wrote. “The specification explains that multiple benefits flow from the ’740 patent’s improved memory system.”

In Nantkwest v. Matal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Eastern District of Virginia’s denial of the USPTO’s request for attorneys’ fees in connection with Nantkwest’s district court appeal of the PTAB rejection of its patent application. At issue was the correct interpretation of Section 145 of the Patent Act, namely the language “[a]ll of the expenses of the proceeding.” The Court held that Section 145 of the Patent Act requires the appellant to pay the USPTO’s attorneys’ fees, regardless of the outcome of the case.