Posts Tagged: "Judge Richard Taranto"

Appellant General Hospital Corp. (“GHC”) appealed the Board’s dismissal of an interference because the claims of its involved patent application lacked sufficient written description. The disclosure of a wide range with exemplary values does not provide written description support for a narrower claimed range, absent something to indicate the claimed range was considered critical or that inventor was in possession of the specific claimed embodiments. The Board cannot reject a motion to add a new claim to a patent application involved in an interference without explaining its findings.

In Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Solutions v. Renesas Electrics, a jury found Renesas liable for both patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation. The jury awarded a reasonable royalty for infringement and a disgorgement of profits for misappropriation. The Federal Circuit affirmed a jury finding that Renesas was liable for trade secret misappropriation and patent infringement for a set of apparatus claims, but vacated the damages awards in the case and remanded for further proceedings… There is no right for a jury to award a disgorgement of profits in trade secret misappropriation cases under the Seventh Amendment. Double recovery of damages for essentially same injury is not justified by presenting two legal theories for relief.

On Wednesday, April 25th, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in Gilead Sciences v. Merck & Co. et. al., which affirmed a lower court’s ruling that Merck could not assert claims from two patents against Gilead because Merck had unclean hands regarding the patents. The case, coming out of the Northern District of California, involves patents covering methods for effectively treating the hepatitis C virus (HCV)… Reviewing the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit panel found sufficient evidence supporting the district court’s findings of serious business misconduct by Merck, that Merck’s misconduct was related to the litigation and that litigation misconduct had occurred based on false testimony provided by Merck’s non-firewalled patent lawyer, who had originally testified that he was not a party to the March 2004 phone call with Pharmasset.

These issues of fairness and fair use are played out in the recent Oracle v. Google decision. In a convoluted case that has gone up to the Supreme Court once and will again, the Federal Circuit finally was able to make a ruling that the blatant, verbatim copying of computer code is not a fair use. At issue were the copying of 37 Oracle programs or apps, constituting over 11,500 lines of code, by Google for their use in the Android operating system for smart phones and other uses… In the Federal Circuit’s final analysis of the four factors, they again noted that Google could have written their own code or properly licensed with Oracle, but instead chose to copy. “There is nothing fair about taking a copyrighted work verbatim and using it for the same purpose and function as the original in a competing platform.” Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that Google’s use of the Oracle code was not a fair use.

The Federal Circuit found Google’s use of Java API packages in it’s Android operating system was not a fair use as a matter of law, resurrecting a multi-billion dollar copyright case brought by Oracle Corp against Google. With copyrightability and fair use now decided, unless the Supreme Court intervenes (which seems unlikely) this case will head back to the district court for a damages trial with the sole question being how much money Google owes Oracle America. “This is a hugely important development in the law of copyright and fair use. If it stands, there are numerous implications,” said J. Michael Keyes is a partner at the international law firm Dorsey & Whitney.

The Board is not compelled by Federal Circuit precedent or PTO guidelines to consider arguments and evidence presented for the first time during oral argument. However, if the Board does consider new arguments or evidence, the responding party must be given an opportunity to submit rebuttal arguments and evidence.

The Federal Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Timothy Dyk, Jimmie Reyna and Richard Taranto noted that “the matter at hand reveals a gap in our jurisprudence on what constitutes ‘use’ under § 271(a).” The Federal Circuit found no controlling precedent on the definition of “use” of a claimed system when the accused infringer must act to put the claimed system into service but does not appear to possess any element of the claimed system. Further, the panel felt that McDonald’s had overstated the Federal Circuit’s holding in Uniloc as the appellate court concluded that a single party can still use a system and directly infringe a patent even when that system requires multiple parties to function. “Therefore, Uniloc only broadened the scope of potential direct infringers under § 271(a),” the Federal Circuit found.

In Atrix Software v. Green Shades Software, Aatrix sued Green Shades for infringement, and Green Shades moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, holding: (1) claim 1 of the ‘615 patent was not directed to any tangible embodiment and was not patent-eligible subject matter under § 101; and (2) under the Alice/Mayo two-step analysis, the remaining claims were for abstract ideas without inventive concepts and were also ineligible. Aatrix appealed. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s decision, reversed its denial of Aatrix’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and remanded for further proceedings… Allegations in a patent infringement complaint that create a factual dispute about whether the claimed invention contains an inventive concept will defeat a motion to dismiss under § 101. For software inventions, such allegations include improvements in how a computer functions. An amended complaint to make such allegations should generally be allowed.

“The Aatrix ruling is significant because when deciding a motion to dismiss all factual allegations made by the plaintiff (i.e., the patent owner) in the complaint are supposed to be taken as true,” explained patent attorney Gene Quinn. “The Federal Circuit has not always seemed to apply basic, fundamental procedural rules when reviewing cases dismissed for lack of patent eligibility on a motion to dismiss. Returning patent litigation to the status quo required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will make it much more difficult for defendants to prevail on motions to dismiss if complaints are properly worded.”

Merck appealed the lower court’s finding of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,127,353 (“the ‘353 patent”), which is directed toward mometasone furoate monohydrate (“MFM”), commercially used in Merck’s Nasonex… Merck further contended that the district court erred by basing its non-infringement ruling on the “Day 1 Batches” rather than the “A Batches” because the focus must be on what will be the final commercial product. However, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument by pointing out Merck’s failure to prove a material difference between the “Day 1 Batches” and the “Day 4 Batches” and “A Batches.”

Despite its ultimate conclusion, the Court observed that Nordt failed to “persuasively or precisely” articulate to the Board “what structural limitation is imparted” by the “injection molded” language. The Federal Circuit explained that had Nordt better articulated its arguments to the Board it may well have succeeded at the Board. Nevertheless, Nordt’s failure to identify that structure did not affect the panel’s conclusion, as the structural nature of “injection molded” can be gleaned from the plain claim language in conjunction with the specification.

Berkheimer is also equally important, if not more important, because it stands for the proposition that questions of fact can and do underline patent eligibility determinations. This is important not only because it will make summary judgment more difficult for infringers, but because if there are questions of fact underneath the patent eligibility determination it should be exceptionally difficult (if not virtually impossible) for district courts to dismiss patent infringement complaints using FRCP 12(b)(6). This is true because under FRCP 12(b)(6) all facts asserted in the complaint by the plaintiff (i.e., the patent owner) are taken as true and dismissal appropriate only where there can be no victory by the plaintiff even based on the facts plead in the complaint.

While the Court affirmed several of the Board’s validity findings, it reversed the determination that the ’455 PCT qualifies as prior art. At issue was the extent to which the ‘817 application included the disclosures of Severinsky, so that challenged claims would antedate the ‘455 PCT. Paice argued that Severinsky was incorporated into the ‘817 application and was not prior art. Therefore, certain challenged claims could rely on Severinsky for the ‘817 priority date, which was earlier than the ’455 PCT.

On Tuesday, January 23rd, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a ruling in Google LLC v. Network-1 Technologies, Inc. which affirmed a finding by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) that a patent covering a method of identifying media linked over the Internet was valid. The Federal Circuit disagreed with Google that the PTAB erred in its claim construction during the validity trial, leaving in place a patent that has been asserted by Network-1 against Google’s major online media platform YouTube.

While the recent decision did uphold the PTAB’s finding of validity of some claims, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded part of the decision in a way that further highlights the revolving door of validity challenges taking place between the Federal Circuit and the PTAB… The recent Federal Circuit decision on Nintendo’s appeal of the ‘796 final written decision issued by the PTAB found that substantial evidence supports the PTAB’s determination that the challenged claims of the ‘796 patent were adequately supported by the written description of the grandparent application. However, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded because the panel did not believe all of the challenged claims were reduced to practice as the result of the 1998 working prototype. The existence of a reduction to practice associated with the 1998 working prototype is important because if all of the claims has been reduced to practice with the 1998 working prototype Yasushi would not be prior art.