Posts Tagged: "jurisdiction"

A judge has affirmed the ability of the UK courts to settle FRAND terms of a patent license covering foreign patents, despite the defendants challenging the court’s jurisdiction. But in his judgment, published on November 4 20201, His Honour Judge Hacon noted that the current framework for settling a global license between owners of standard essential patents (SEPs) and implementers “is plainly not satisfactory.” He explained: “[I]t does encourage expensive parallel litigation in several jurisdictions and more uncertainty than is necessary. I doubt that it can be sustained in the long term.” The case is one of many that SEP owners have brought before the courts since the UK Supreme Court judgment in the Unwired Planet and Conversant litigation established English courts’ jurisdiction to set global FRAND terms in August 2020.

On May 12, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed and remanded the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action in an appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint was brought by Trimble, Inc. (Trimble) and Innovative Software Engineering, LLC (ISE) against PerDiemCo, seeking a declaratory judgment that neither Trimble nor ISE infringed any of the 11 patents that PerDiemCo asserted against it.

In a ruling concerning patent portfolios owned by Unwired Planet and Conversant, the UK Supreme Court has upheld lower decisions that English courts can determine fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms for worldwide patent licenses, and grant injunctions. The Court’s unanimous judgment in the three cases (Unwired Planet International Ltd and another v Huawei Technologies (UK) Co Ltd and another, Huawei Technologies Co Ltd and another v Conversant Wireless Licensing SÀRL and ZTE Corporation and another v Conversant Wireless Licensing SÀRL [2020] UKSC 37) was issued today (August 26), after the Court heard arguments in October 2019.

In a precedential opinion, Intellisoft v. Acer, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), in a decision authored by Judge Dyk, held that the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (the district court) erred in refusing to remand a case where removal was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and §1454… Despite Acer’s contentions, the CAFC found that Intellisoft’s trade secret misappropriation claim did not “necessarily” raise patent law issues that would result in district court original jurisdiction. The CAFC first noted that ownership of a trade secret under state law does not require proof of patent ownership.

The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018), considered whether the TC Heartland decision extended to foreign defendants to afford them the protections of the special patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). By finding that no such protections existed, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the longstanding rule that suits against foreign (alien) defendants “are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special.” HTC, 889 F.3d at 1354 (citing Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972)). While foreign defendants can still try to persuade a district court judge to transfer a case to a new venue on the basis of the parties’ convenience, the venue laws otherwise offer no protection for foreign defendants.

On September 5,  the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) held that state sovereignty principles asserted by the Board of Regents of the University of Texas System (UT) do not give UT the right to bring suit in an improper venue. The appeal clarifies once again that sovereign immunity may be used only as a shield, not a sword. UT argued that Boston Scientific Corporation’s request that the case be transferred to the District of Delaware should be reversed because venue was proper in the Western District of Texas since a state has the right to sue a nonresident in a forum of its choosing where personal jurisdiction is satisfied. It argued that the federal patent venue statute cannot override this sovereign right. UT also argued that the District of Delaware lacks jurisdiction because UT never consented to suit in Delaware, nor did it waive its sovereignty in Delaware or abrogate its sovereignty by statute. The CAFC disagreed with the above, holding that state sovereignty does not allow states to bring patent infringement suits in an improper venue, as is the case where BSC does not have a place of business in Texas. It also held in Regents of University of Cal. V. Eli Lilly & Co. that sovereign immunity does not apply where the state acts only as the plaintiff, and therefore the right of UT to choose the forum does not apply because the Eleventh Amendment only applies to suits against a state, not by a state.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled that an EU trade mark (EUTM) proprietor may bring an infringement action in an EU Member State where advertising or offers for sale are directed or located, in a case concerning alleged infringement of an EUTM in the United Kingdom by a Spanish defendant. The judgment in Case C172/18 AMS Neve Ltd, Barnett Waddingham Trustees, Mark Crabtree v Heritage Audio SL, Pedro Rodríguez Arribas addresses questions concerning jurisdiction, in particular in cases involving Internet sales. This litigation concerned infringement proceedings brought regarding an EUTM for “1073” in the UK Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court.

On Friday, June 15th, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc in Xitronix Corporation v. KLA-Tencor Corporation. The petition for rehearing was filed by KLA-Tencor after the Federal Circuit first decided Xitronix back in February of this year, where the appellate court held that it didn’t have jurisdiction to hear an appeal in a patent case which only involved claims of monopolization under U.S. Supreme Court standards set in 1965’s Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.

In a patent infringement case governed by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (“BPCIA”), the Federal Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to compel discovery in the district court. The Court also found that Amgen failed to meet the requirements for mandamus relief. Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2017) (Before Dyk, Bryson, and Chen, J.) (Opinion for the court, Dyk, J.)… When filing a BPCIA paragraph (l)(3) list of patents that could potentially be infringed by a biosimilar, all patents that could reasonably be infringed, based on available knowledge without discovery, should be included on that list. In an interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit lacks “collateral order” jurisdiction to compel a district court to order discovery concerning non-listed patents, nor is mandamus warranted, because relief is available on appeal from a final judgment.

There is simply no reason for so many patent cases to wind up in a district with so little relation to those cases. Basic principles of equity and justice don’t vanish just because a patent is involved. The court hearing a patent case should have a real interest in the case, just like any tort or contract case. The Eastern District of Texas has literally created a local industry of patent litigation, intentionally or not. Even local businesses acknowledge it and exploit it. Patent venue reform is long overdue, and it’s something that Congress can and should get done.

Polar argued on appeal that the district court erred in finding that Suunto did not have sufficient contacts in Delaware. The Court agreed with Polar. The Court held that there were sufficient contacts, because there was evidence Suunto purposefully shipped at least ninety-four accused products to Delaware retailers and fully expected that its products would then be sold in Delaware. The record also showed that Suunto entered into a distribution agreement with ASWO to market and distribute its products in the United States. It was Suunto who physically fulfilled orders, packaged products, and prepared shipments intended for Delaware. Suunto did not simply leave the products on a dock in Finland. Because Suunto purposefully availed itself of the Delaware market, the Court concluded that Suunto had sufficient minimum contacts with Delaware.

Due to a bizarre jurisdictional “feature,” the Board does not actually get jurisdiction over a case until either a Reply Brief has been filed or the time to file a Reply Brief has run. See 37 CFR 41.35(a). What this means is the patent examiner, in order to frustrate the applicant’s ability to have the Board hear a case, can simply refuse to file an Examiner’s Answer and instead reopen prosecution. This happens all too frequently in some Art Units.