Posts Tagged: "Matal v. Tam"

Recent controversy surrounding Kim Kardashian’s truncated move to trademark the term “Kimono” for her new line of undergarment shapewear has subsided, with Kardashian formally announcing that she is abandoning the effort. Kardashian explained the mark as serving the dual purposes of being a play on her name and showing respect for the Japanese culture. In fact, Kimono is Japanese for a traditional long, baggy garment that has been worn by Japanese women for centuries. Kardashian’s effort caused an uproar among the Japanese community in Japan and here in the United States. The community accused Kardashian of trying to exploit a centuries-old Japanese tradition for commercial gain. The controversy prompted the mayor of Kyoto to write a letter to Kardashian, in which he noted the sensitivity of the Japanese people to her move and urged her to drop the effort. Although the immediate controversy has now subsided, Kardashian’s truncated effort has renewed debate around the larger issue of “cultural appropriation” and its intersection with trademark law.

The Supreme Court issued its decision yesterday in Iancu v. Brunetti. As largely expected, the Court followed its own lead in Matal v. Tam and struck down the Lanham Act’s bar on “immoral or scandalous” trademarks as violating the First Amendment. Below are some insider perspectives on what the ruling means for brands and trademark practitioners going forward.

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently struck down certain trademark registration requirements on First Amendment grounds. These cases raise questions about whether similar alcohol labeling requirements likewise violate the First Amendment. In the U.S., alcohol is a regulated product at both the state and federal level. Federally, the Alcohol Administration Act (FAA Act) sets forth the labeling requirements for distilled spirits, wine and malt beverages. Alcohol producers must get alcohol labels approved by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB). These approvals come in the form of a Certificate of Label Approval/Exemption or “COLA.” The labeling requirements of the FAA Act are detailed in 27 U.S.C. §205(e) and prohibit labels that “are disparaging of a competitor’s products or are false, misleading, obscene, or indecent…” See 27 U.S.C. §205(e)(4). The associated rules are promulgated in 27 C.F.R. Parts 4, 5, and 7. These rules similarly prohibit statements on labels that are “disparaging of a competitor’s products,” or which are “obscene or indecent.” 27 C.F.R. §4.39, §5.42, and §7.29.

On May 2, 2019, the USPTO issued a new examination guide titled “Examination of Marks for Cannabis and Cannabis-Related Goods and Services after Enactment of the 2018 Farm Bill.” A hasty reader may have assumed that this guide would offer options for the cannabis business whose federal trademark applications have been thwarted by the lawful use requirement, but this is not the case.The lawful use requirement, as explained by the USPTO, mandates that “use of a mark in commerce must be lawful use to be the basis for federal registration of the mark.” TMEP §907, citing to 37 C.F.R. §2.69 and §§1, 45 of the Lanham Act. In other words, if a product cannot be legally sold in interstate commerce then, according to the USPTO, the mark cannot be used legally in interstate commerce and, lacking trademark use, the trademark cannot be registered. Alas, the new examination guide only allows federal trademark registrations under very narrow circumstances. Under Sections 6 and 297A of the Farm Bill 2018, “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant, including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids, salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol [THC] concentration of not more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis” are removed from the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). In effect, these plants and their parts have become legal. Similarly, cannabidiol—commonly referred to as CBD—and those CBD products that have very low THC content, have become legal under the CSA. Being legal under the CSA means that these products can be legally sold in interstate commerce.

Following our visit to the Supreme Court for Monday’s entertaining oral argument in Iancu v. Brunetti, we can report that the Court seems likely to strike down, on First Amendment grounds, the statutory restriction on federal registration of trademarks that are “immoral or scandalous.”  It seems less likely that the case will generate a clear and ringing statement of First Amendment principles. Rather, the justices’ comments at argument seem to presage a limited, cautious opinion. The Court’s main legal concerns appear to be the facial overbreadth of the existing statute and its history of inconsistent application. Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) may  therefore be left with room to try again, seeking a narrower and more predictable approach to limiting the federal registration of dirty words as trademarks (especially given the Court’s main practical concern of the loss of civility represented by the proliferation of such marks).

On April 15, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Iancu v. Brunetti, a case the International Trademark Association (INTA) has remarked raises a critical issue for all trademark owners—namely, which trademarks reliably can be expected to obtain registration under the Lanham Act. At the heart of the case, and of the amicus brief we helped file for INTA this week, is whether free speech concerns should trump the statutory bar on registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks. INTA says the First Amendment should win out, and the statutory bar should fall. The category of marks at issue is exemplified by the FUCT apparel mark, owned by Erik Brunetti, to which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) denied federal registration. After the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Section 2(a)’s bar on registering immoral or scandalous marks is an unconstitutional restriction of free speech, the U.S. government sought the Supreme Court’s review, and the Court granted certiorari. It must now decide whether the prohibition in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act on the federal registration of “immoral . . . or scandalous” marks like FUCT is invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

The U.S. Supreme Court on January 4th granted certiorari to take up Iancu v. Brunetti on appeal from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The case asks the nation’s highest court to answer the question of whether the Lanham Act’s prohibition on the federal registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks is facially invalid under the First Amendment’s free speech clause.

The Solicitor General is arguing that Erik Brunetti has no right to require the government to register a scandalous mark or to inscribe the term on the Federal Register. Brunetti’s reply pushes back, pointing to instances where the USPTO approved trademark registrations for profane, excretory or sexual terms.

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recently released its 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, setting various goals to ensure high quality services for the agency’s customers and stakeholders aligned with the Department of Commerce’s strategic objective to strengthen intellectual property protection… “We are confident in attaining the goals set out in this plan and look forward to the continued engagement and feedback from our stakeholders and employees,” Director Andrei Iancu is quoted as saying in a press release issued by the USPTO upon the release of the new strategic plan. “Together we celebrate innovation and entrepreneurship—we are very proud of the men and women who stand behind a well-balanced American intellectual property system.”

On September 7, 2018, the government filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the case relating to Eric Brunetti’s clothing brand, called FUCT. Although Brunetti has marketed various apparel under the FUCT mark since the early 1990s, the application at issue in this case was filed in 2011. The examiner rejected the application under Section 2(a), finding that FUCT “is the past tense of F*CK,” and “is scandalous because it is disparaging and [] total[ly] vulgar.” The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board agreed, finding that “the Trademark Examining Attorney has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial composite of the general public would find this designation vulgar.” If the U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear the Brunetti case, it could have a substantial impact on “shock value” marks in commerce.

Many other related issues remain ripe for consideration in Brunetti and future cases. Most significantly, are trademarks considered “commercial speech?”  If so, laws relating to trademarks might be subject to relaxed scrutiny for constitutional compliance rather than strict scrutiny… While Tam settled some issues related to The Slants, the Washington Redskins, and D*kes on Bikes, the decision’s full impact remains to be seen.  Brunetti seems to be a promising avenue for the Supreme Court to address some of the tangential issues left open by the Tam decision.

A little more than one year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Lanham Act’s disparagement clause as unconstitutional in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (June 19, 2017).  While Tam settled some issues related to The Slants, the Washington Redskins, and D*kes on Bikes, the decision’s full impact remains to be seen. Issues remain ripe for future consideration. Most significantly, are trademarks considered “commercial speech?”  If so, laws relating to trademarks might be subject to relaxed scrutiny for constitutional compliance rather than strict scrutiny.

The USPTO issued Examination Guide 01-17 on Monday, June 26, 2017, entitled “Examination Guidance for Section 2(a)’s Disparagement Provision after Matal v. Tam and Examination for Compliance with Section 2(a)’s Scandalousness Provision While Constitutionality Remains in Question.” This Guide explains how trademark applications with arguably disparaging or scandalous content will be examined in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Matal… The Supreme Court’s ruling in Matal cleared the way for a slew of new and possibly offensive trademark applications of a kind that have been consistently denied since 1946. Whether this protection will be extended to a wider category of potentially incendiary marks hinges on the Federal Court’s pending review of Brunetti.

The Supreme Court ruled that the anti-disparagement clause in the Lanham Act violates the Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment. Matal v. Tam. As a result, the United States Patent and Trademark Office may no longer deny registration of a federal trademark application on the ground of disparagement. Several states, including Massachusetts and New Hampshire, have anti-disparagement trademark provisions that will no longer be enforceable either… The statute does not define ‘scandalous’, but like the restriction against disparaging marks, the courts and the PTO focus on whether a mark is offensive.

After a streak of six patent decisions uniformly overruling the Federal Circuit, and for the first time all term, the Supreme Court finally handed the Federal Circuit a win this week. In its landmark ruling in Matal v. Tam (formerly Lee v. Tam), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the restriction on the registration of marks that “disparage” under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote unanimously for the eight justices in holding that Section 2(a)’s prohibition on disparaging registrations violates “a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”