Posts Tagged: "Noerr-Pennington Doctrine"

Federal Trade Commission Urges SCOTUS to Deny AbbVie Petition

On Wednesday, May 19, the response brief of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in AbbVie v. FTC. The petition for writ of certiorari filed by AbbVie asks the nation’s highest court to decide whether lower courts erred in finding that AbbVie’s Hatch-Waxman district court litigation involving patents covering its AndroGel testosterone treatment met the sham litigation exception to Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The FTC’s brief urged the Supreme Court to deny AbbVie’s petition for writ, a decision that arguably could cast into doubt pharmaceutical firms’ ability to enforce their patent rights under decades-old legislation meant to balance the economic interests of innovative drug developers with the public interests served by generic drug makers.

Standard Essential Patents, Antitrust and Market Power

Antitrust agency communications, such as the EU Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines and the FTC/DOJ Licensing Guidelines underline that market power does not necessarily result from patent ownership as such. They contain, however, no specific language on standard-essential patents which are – if they are valid and truly standard-essential – different from other patents in that they must, by definition, be used in order to operate on the respective standard-based market. In Europe at least, it seems to be increasingly accepted that SEPs can convey market power but that they do not necessarily always do so. Advocate General Wathelet’s proposition (para. 57 et seq. of his opinion in the Huawei/ZTE case) to establish a rebuttable presumption that SEP ownership generates market power has not been taken up by the CJEU’s Huawei/ZTE-decision, probably because the parties already agreed that Huawei held a dominant position (para. 43). But court decisions from the UK (for instance Unwired Planet/Huawei, a summary of the case is provided here) and Germany (for instance LG Düsseldorf, 26.3.2015, 4b O 140/13) have taken a case-sensitive approach, looking not only at the leverage generated by a SEP but also at circumstances which may limit its holder’s power.