Posts Tagged: "NPE’s"

Anyone who has followed recent developments in the U.S. patent landscape, however, might note something interesting occurring in this particular case. According to the recent patent assertion entity (PAE) report put out by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Network-1’s business activities would seem to put it in the category of what the FTC calls a “litigation PAE.”… Unfortunately for the FTC, Network-1’s license agreement with Polycom is horribly inconsistent with the agency’s findings on the exact business model that Network-1 seems to employ.

Basing policy recommendations on no evidence, or at best anecdotal evidence, has great potential to do more harm than good…especially when some of the missing evidence is the other side of the equation – the benefits afforded by patent licensing activity… Instead of seizing the opportunity to survey the patent licensing landscape and shed light on behavior that otherwise is invisible to the public, the FTC squandered the chance and instead developed two arbitrary categories of PAEs, determined that one of these categories was not good, and developed a set of policy recommendations because of “nuisance” litigation. By making recommendations without gathering or using the very facts that were supposed to be the public benefit of this PAE study, the FTC’s report is undoubtedly going to do more harm than good.

Why should the costs of the tortfeasing infringer be relevant in determining whether the extracted value from a settlement is fair? The fact that law firms charge a lot of money to defend patent infringement cases, and don’t particularly have any incentive to settle cases early, somehow translates into certain settlements being for nuisance value without any consideration of whether the settlement is a fair value for the rights trampled upon by the infringer? The FTC has quite a lot of explaining to do, because it seems they picked an arbitrary number that is a function of what attorneys ordinarily charge infringing defendants through discovery. I don’t see how that is a function of the value of the innovation, or how it says anything about the merits of the infringement case, the damages case, or the tactics of the patent owner. In fact, it seems as if the $300,000 figure is completely irrelevant.

Simply stated, Fortune is wrong. The FTC report did not have harsh words for patent trolls. In fact, the FTC had harsh words for those who use the term “patent troll” to vilify patent owners! At the risk of upsetting the predetermined narrative obviously favored by Fortune, allow us to interject some facts into this discussion… Perhaps Fortune confined their coverage of the FTC report to the press release accompanying the report, which conspicuously leaves out any mention of patent trolls, or that they view the term “patent troll” as being unhelpful and prejudicial. Seriously, if you are going to cover a report shouldn’t you at least read all of Chapter One?

To be fair, the coverage by Ars Technica doesn’t take the same vituperative tone as other voices who have concerns related to abuses of the U.S. patent system. However, it’s paramount for those who are covering the patent world to be judicious in their use of the “patent troll” designation, especially as the problem has been used to support legislation proposed in both houses of Congress… Ars could absolutely be accused of having a knowledge of the U.S. patent system that fails to account for some important nuances in patent licensing and enforcement. Indeed, they would do well to take into consideration the FTC’s recent admonition in the long awaited PAE report: “In the Commission’s view, a label like ‘patent troll’ is unhelpful because it invites pre-judgment about the societal impact of patent assertion activity without an understanding of the underlying business model that fuels such activity.”

Yahoo’s proposed auction of the Excalibur portfolio is likely to be the largest sale of computer-related patents since the Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l ruling in June of 2014. Alice may reduce the number of overly-broad patents in existence in the long run, but (ironically) in the short term the decision may have skewed patent value calculations in a way that encourages the kinds of behaviors it was supposed to negate. A sale of the Excalibur patents will provide an important test of Alice’s effects in the short term.

The validity of secondary markets for a variety of goods and services is never questioned. Securities are sold and resold many times after their initial offering, homes and buildings and built and resold many times, as are automobiles. A quick review of the products listed an eBay leaves little doubt that a robust secondary market exists for many goods and services across the American economy. However, not everyone is in agreement that a secondary patent market is beneficial. For some reason, many people villainize companies that practice patent licensing. Even resorting to the use of pejorative terms such as “patent troll” to describe these businesses. These detractors fail to account for the fact that inventors may not be the most efficient licensors. In addition, they don’t take into account that, just as a builder generates revenue to build more buildings by selling their current ones, companies that sell or license patents help fund further R&D with the proceeds.

The information the FTC has been collecting regarding patent assertion entities is extensive. Along with standard corporate information, the FTC is making a survey of each patent in PAE portfolios going back to 2008 to investigate the date of patent acquisition, the patent’s maintenance fee status as well as the assertion history for all patents upon which the PAE has attempted to enforce its rights. Firms are also being asked to describe their business model, the methods used to organize their patent portfolios and the aggregate costs of patent acquisition and assertion. The FTC has sent information requests to 25 PAEs in order to build its evidence.

There is simply no reason for so many patent cases to wind up in a district with so little relation to those cases. Basic principles of equity and justice don’t vanish just because a patent is involved. The court hearing a patent case should have a real interest in the case, just like any tort or contract case. The Eastern District of Texas has literally created a local industry of patent litigation, intentionally or not. Even local businesses acknowledge it and exploit it. Patent venue reform is long overdue, and it’s something that Congress can and should get done.

The patent trolling by MPHJ and owner, Texas lawyer Jay Mac Rust, are well known. But now the SEC is going after Jay Mac Rust in federal court for fraud. The SEC’s complaint maintains that Atlantic had “no ability or intention to obtain these loans.” Rather, of the money the two collected, the SEC alleges that Rust took $662,000 from client funds for personal pay and risky securities investments; Brenner himself took $595,000, and both made investments claiming that the money was personally theirs and not from the client funds. Investigations at a brokerage firm where these trades were taking place led the SEC to discover the fraudulent activities.

Regulators face a twofold challenge: First, they need to balance the legitimate interests of patent holders and licensees in order to determine which activities and contracts the law will enforce, or otherwise recognize as creating legal rights. Second, they need to establish rules that minimize both the costs of assessing a given case, and the costs of taking wrong decisions. One traditional approach has been to use antitrust law.

The set of questions asked will also naturally curb the conclusions that can be drawn from the study. This is true of any survey, but it is worth noting the particular constraints of the 6(b) PAE study. First, the questionnaires have been sent to licensors only; no licensees were surveyed. This is a significant limitation, as a study of patent litigation necessarily restricts the analysis to failed negotiations between two parties, potential licensors and potential licensees. The 6(b) study conducts a survey only of parties on one side of patent negotiations and therefore cannot generate a full dataset for understanding the conduct of the parties in patent license negotiation or the reasons for the failure of negotiations. Second, as the study is designed to elicit information from distinct types of patent-holders – PAEs and a limited set of practicing and non-practicing wireless chipset companies – it will by design not elicit information relevant to the full range of patent owners.

Pre-litigation review of cases to weed out instances of patent trolling sounds like a great idea, but what more weeding out do the authors want? Since the Supreme Court decided Alice v. CLS Bank nearly 70% of all software patents have been invalidated by district courts as being patent ineligible, which is almost always done at the motion to dismiss stage. Furthermore, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) institutes 80% of the challenges to patents they receive. Indeed, it seems that over the past 5 years with nearly every court decision and piece of legislation more rights are taken away from patent owners, patents are no longer presumed valid and district courts are disposing of an alarmingly high number of patent infringement cases on motions to dismiss. It is enormously ignorant to suggest changes to “U.S. IP policy” that would make it more difficult for patent owners. Only those unfamiliar with industry reality could make such a recklessly suggestion. Of course, familiarity with the industry is unfortunately not a prerequisite for academics hell-bent on reaching the wrong conclusion.

It’s very unlikely that obtaining data from just 25 PAEs will provide a representative sampling of PAEs given that the universe of PAEs is largely unknown and probably very diverse… The problem is that in my experience both lawmakers and regulators routinely ignore important statistical limitations of federal studies. I say this with the experience of having worked for over 20 years as a federal government statistician. All too often policymakers use federal studies in ways beyond their intended purposes, with the result that legislation or regulation may be based on a flimsy and potentially inaccurate understanding of the underlying problem or the costs or benefits of proposed government action.

First, the definition of PAE used by the FTC characterizes all PAEs as the same. But in treating patent licensing firms as a homogenous category, the FTC fails to recognize there is a wide spectrum of business models that exist under the licensing umbrella. Second, and related to the first, there are serious methodological questions that undermine any conclusions that could be drawn from the FTC’s data.