Posts Tagged: "obviousness"

The absolute truth known to everyone in the innovation community is that pioneering innovations become commonplace. What was revolutionary at the time the invention was made becomes taken from granted. In hindsight pioneering innovations look insignificant because they have become ubiquitous. The public, judges and critics find it difficult (assuming they try) to determine whether that which is commonplace today was really, truly obvious decades earlier as of the critical date. Even when an honest and fair obviousness inquiry is undertake it can be exceptionally difficult to put yourself back to before the invention was made in order to determine what was known and what was obvious at the time. But let’s dispense with the ridiculousness, shall we? The overwhelming majority of the world was not at all knowledgeable about or clued into the World Wide Web at the time this innovation was first made. So let’s dispense with the histrionics.

Earlier today the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued it latest decision in Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc. (Fed. Cir., September 4, 2013). This latest decision was necessitated by the limited grant of rehearing ordered on June 13, 2013. The rehearing was granted for the purpose of clarifying the status of claims 34 and 35 of Patent No. 5,715,314. Before jumping into the substance of this case, the first thing I noticed was that Seth Waxman of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr was listed as the lead attorney for Soverain Software in both the petition for rehearing and the ensuing briefs. It is hard to imagine that Soverain has brought in Seth Waxman at this late stage if they are not contemplating an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Logically, if the application does not describe an invention in terms that allows one skilled in the art to make and use it, then the Patent Office should not have sufficient information to suggest that the application is not novel or obvious. In order to determine something is not novel or obvious you first have to know what it is. I have no objection to the Patent Office putting a 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) and novelty/obviousness rejection in the same Office Action, where the PTO explains that to the best of their understanding of the invention it would not be novel or obvious for the following reasons.

In contrast to the Federal Circuit’s 2012 decisions in the context of pharmaceutical litigation, its decisions with respect to appeals from the Board were much less favorable to those seeking patent protection. This is likely the result of the different standard applied to Board decisions – while the question of obviousness is one of law and reviewed de novo, it is based on factual findings, and the appellant must do more than simply demonstrate that the Board’s decision was wrong. Instead, the appellant will prevail only if he/she can show that the decision was not based on “substantial evidence.” Moreover, unlike in district court litigation, the Patent Office is not required to establish obviousness by a “clear and convincing” standard.

A few trends were readily apparent in 2012. First, pharmaceutical patent holders in litigation fared well – in a series of cases, the Federal Circuit rejected obviousness attacks in pharmaceutical patent challenges on appeal from the district courts. Second, patent holders appealing decisions from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (whether it be an original application, a reexamination, or a reissue) fared poorly – the Federal Circuit affirmed several Board decisions finding chemical patent claims obvious. While these trends are not surprising, a third more subtle trend suggests chemical patents in district court litigation may be less susceptible to invalidation for obviousness post-KSR. In 2012, when the Federal Circuit reversed the obviousness decision below on a chemical patent, those reversals favored non-obviousness three to one.

The Tokai and Ritchie rationale seems to have never been cited by any other panels of the Court. While this may be due to many reasons, the fact that this reasoning could so easily invalidate virtually any claim in any patent, combined with the fact that it has only scarcely been utilized by the Court, suggests that this is an extraordinarily important issue for the Court as a whole to consider.

A factual determination of the Board is to be upheld if there is substantial evidence to support it, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and a finding is supported by substantial evidence if reasonable minds might accept the evidence as supporting the factual finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). This has been translated by the Federal Circuit to mean “is the determination unreasonable?” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

This case intrigued me from the start because it seemed rather odd that there should be a nonprecedential opinion in an appeal to the Federal Circuit necessitated by a completely adjudicated inter partes reexamination at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Moreover, the original panel concluded that the combination of known elements resulted in a predictable result. The problem with that reasoning, however, is that not all of the elements were found within the prior art. In fact, the Board found that there are no fewer than three (3) meaningful structural differences between the invention as claimed and the prior art.

When approaching an obviousness determination it is essential to understand what makes the invention unique. It is also necessary to start to envision the arguments that can be made to distinguish the invention over the totality of the prior art. This is required because when a patent examiner deals with issues of obviousness they will look at a variety of references and pull one element from one reference and another element of the invention from another reference. Ultimately the patent examiner will see if they can find all the pieces, parts and functionality of the invention in the prior art, and indicating that a combination of the prior art references discloses your invention. There is more to it than just finding every piece and part, because on some level all inventions are made up of known pieces, parts and functionality. The true inquiry is to determine whether the combination of the pieces, parts and functionality found within the applicable technology field of the invention would be considered to be within the “common sense” of one of skill in the art such that the invention is merely a trivial rearrangement of what is already known to exist.

In a nutshell, an invention would be obvious when someone knowledgable about the area would look at your invention and consider it to be already known; not exactly but rather known if one were to combine several references. In other words, the predictable and non-unique combination of what multiple references teach would yield your invention. The prototypical example is when you have invented A+B. A is known in the prior art, and B is known in the prior art. Upon looking at A and then looking at B, would someone of skill in the art consider A+B to be already known? If the answer is yes, then A+B is obvious. If the answer is no, then A+B is not obvious.

This is a good time to review the implications of this case, but an even better time to look into the origins and constitutionality of the Non-obviousness requirement. You might object that the jurisprudence of the non-obviousness requirement is so well established that nothing can be learned from this sort of analysis. I disagree. Patent law is under assault by the Supreme Court, the media, the ‘information wants to be free’ crowd, multinational corporations, and the economics profession. If we attempt to explain patent law based on the decisions of people who never passed the patent bar, never wrote a patent, never prosecuted a patent, and do not have a technical background, we are doomed. We need to define patent law as a natural law/right based on certain fundamental truths. This is the only way to get the non-patent attorney judge or the general public to understand patent law and understand that it represents justice.

On Monday, April 30, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued its final decision in the matter of KSR v. Teleflex, which overruled the Federal Circuit’s application of the so-called “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test (or simply TSM) as it applies to determining whether an invention is obvious. At least for the last generation (and likely longer) no other Supreme Court case in the patent arena has been nearly as influential as the Court’s decision in KSR v. Teleflex. This is because obviousness is where the rubber meets the road for the patentability of inventions. This 5th Anniversary of the ruling provides an opportunity to revisit the decision and where we have come since. This will be a recurring theme this week on IPWatchdog.com as we look at the law of obviousness in the wake of this infamous decision.

Upon hearing Rader make such a bold statement the first thought that ran through my mind was — Really? Did he just say that? I have heard from others for some time that Rader has been heard to say these or similar things relating to obviousness, but I just discounted them as one would discount the output of a game of telephone. After something gets stated, shared and restated there is typically little of the same message remaining. That had to be why Rader was reported to have said such curious things about obviousness and the impact of KSR. But then I was sitting right there listening to Chief Judge Rader say something that is provably incorrect. I’ll bite. I’ll take that challenge.

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