Posts Tagged: "oed"

Mariano Rivera knows something about perfection. The New York Yankees now-retired pitcher is regarded by many experts as the greatest closer in the history of major league baseball. For those who are not aficionados of America’s Pastime, the closer comes in after the game has largely been played, and his sole job is to get the last several opposing batters…

The USPTO charged that Hicks violated 37 C.F.R. 10.20 et seq.[1] Ultimately, Hicks acknowledged that he violated 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(5), which prohibited “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” *** Thus, Hicks likely stands for the proposition that a practitioner must inform OED if they know that another practitioner has made a false, misleading or improper statement to a tribunal, or as Hicks did, cites a non-precedential opinion to a tribunal.

These three proceedings, like every other reciprocal disciplinary proceeding, demonstrate the overwhelming importance of obtaining the best resolution possible when the State ethics authorities come knocking. Because there is a presumption that reciprocal discipline is appropriate, to prevail at the USPTO you would need to demonstrate that there was a lack of due process, complete lack of evidence or that there is some manifest injustice that would occur if discipline were to be handed out by the USPTO. Whether we like it or not, you are going to be disciplined by the USPTO to the same extent you were disciplined by the State ethics panel, or a Federal Court. However, this sometimes seems to lead to unequal treatment of practitioners who are similarly situated but for the State in which they are admitted. Eventually someone will raise an equal protection argument, but you don’t want that to be you. It would have a significant uphill battle no doubt like all such arguments, but it would be very nice for OED to take a step back and consider whether it is fair to simply defer its own disciplinary authority to the States.

Time and time again in reciprocal discipline proceedings we see the USPTO handing down identical discipline to what was handed out at the State level. This is no doubt because State discipline creates a presumption that the imposition of reciprocal discipline is proper. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917). Thus, seeking the identical penalty as already handed out at the State level is relatively easy and straight forward, and puts the responding practitioner at a significant disadvantage, requiring the Respondent to demonstrate lack of due process, severe lack of proof in the State proceeding or that a grave injustice would occur as the result of imposition of reciprocal discipline.

One of the things specifically alleged as demonstrating lack of control over his practice was his antiquated docketing system. Until 2005 Tachner used a “white board” system that was updated monthly and only included three months of data. It only had 3 columns, which were the client docket number, the type of action and the due date. If action were taken a handwritten line entry was placed after the due date. If action was not taken by the due date it would remain not the white board for a few months, but then ultimately removed without any action ever being taken. In 2005, this system was updated to a Word document that did not use tables, but instead included single line strings of data. There was no back-up docketing system, nor was any inventory of files ever done to ensure the integrity of the Word document docket. As you might imagine, this type of “docketing system” created problems.

Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), sets the standards for imposing reciprocal discipline on the basis of a State’s disciplinary adjudication. Under Selling, State disciplinary action creates a federal-level presumption that imposition of reciprocal discipline is proper unless an independent review of the record reveals: (1) lack of due process, (2) an infirmity of proof of the misconduct, or (3) that grave injustice would result from the imposition of reciprocal discipline. The standard the responding attorney must meet is one of clear of convincing evidence that the Selling factors preclude reciprocal discipline.

Jaeger did not file a response to the complaint, despite being granted two extensions of time to do so. He did, however, send two brief fax messages to OED, in one pointing out that he was an honorably discharged veteran who served during the Vietnam era, and in another pointing out that the underlying complaint that initiated disciplinary involvement stemmed from a disagreement with a client who did not want to pay his bill. Unfortunately for Jaeger, however, he never filed an answer, which meant that the allegations within the complaint were all deemed to be admitted. See 37 CFR 11.36(d).

It is not common to see a petition for reinstatement, much less an actual reinstatement. That is, however, what happened with respect to Mr. B., who was suspended nunc pro tunc from October 26, 2009, for a period of 60 months, but with the last 24 months stayed. B’s petition for reinstatement was successful, and he is once again a patent agent registered to practice at the USPTO. In the original disciplinary proceeding that lead to the suspension, the OED Director filed a disciplinary complaint against B on October 26, 2009, and then Director Kappos entered an interim suspension order because B was convicted of a felony. Authority for such an interim suspension comes from 37 CFC 11.25.

What follows are the decisions from April and May 2012. In this time period in 2012 at the OED the Office found themselves dealing with a patent attorney that accepted referrals from an invention promotion company, a patent attorney that didn’t notify a client of an abandoned application, a trademark attorney that submitted false statements in three petitions to revive abandoned applications and a reciprocal discipline involving negligence associated with maintaining a Trust Account.