Posts Tagged: "patent eligibility"

1998: Federal Circuit Says Yes to Business Methods

It is really incorrect to say that the Federal Circuit eliminated the business method exception in State Street Bank, although the same net effect admittedly occurred regardless of how you characterize the ruling. It is better to say that the Federal Circuit went out of its way to explain that the business method exception had really never existed in the first place. The court explained that neither it nor its predecessor court, the CCPA, had ever applied the business method exception to a single case. Furthermore, Judge Rich explained that the cases relied upon to support the existence of the business method exception were In re Maucorps and In re Meyer were both rendered prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr, and prior to the Federal Circuit’s abandonment of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. Furthermore, the Maucorps and Meyer cases were decided not on the business method exception, but on the mathematical algorithm exception.

Alice in Blunderland: The Supreme Court’s Conflation of Abstractness and Obviousness

The problem with this analytical approach lies not in the two-step Mayo “algorithm,” but rather in framing the analysis in terms of subject matter eligibility under Section 101 rather than patentability under 103. Section 101 is intended to deal with the eligibility of the claimed subject matter for patent protection as a class (i.e., genus or sub-genus) of inventions, rather than the contribution of the particular invention (i.e., species) defined by the claim vis-a-vis the prior art. So why did the Supreme Court frame the inquiry in terms of patent-eligible subject matter, rather than proceeding directly to the question of obviousness?

I Thought Banks Didn’t Like Financial Software Patents?

The big banks have backed Schumer for years, which makes sense since he is the senior Senator from the States of New York, which is where all the bankers are located (i.e., on Wall Street). But given all the vitriol aimed at software patents, particularly those in the financial services sector, there is a real irony that big banks are able to get software patents that explicitly cover computer implemented methods in the wake of Alice v. CLS Bank when so many others aren’t. So much of this anti-software patent hysteria was started by the big banks but they seem unaffected. That is an unfortunate theme in America. The big banks on Wall Street destroyed the economy with reckless disregard and yet not a single person went to jail and big bonuses continued to be paid to the very bankers and executives responsible for the economic meltdown that lead to the Great Recession.

Federal Circuit Finds Software Patent Claim Patent Eligible

Of particular interest, the Federal Circuit found that the ‘399 patent constituted patent eligible subject matter, was not invalid and was infringed. This is big news because in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice v. CLS Bank software patents have been falling at alarming rate. Assuming this decision stands any further review we finally have some positive law to draw from that will provide clues into how to tailor patent claims to make them capable of overcoming what has become a significant hurdle to patentability— namely the abstract idea doctrine. Of course, Judge Mayer was in dissent.

Software Patent History III: The Federal Circuit Decides Arrhythmia Research & Alappat

Given that the Supreme Court almost never overrules its own prior decisions, then Justice Rehnquist tried to explain in Diehr that both Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook remained good law, despite the fact that the holding in Diehr clearly set patent eligibility for software on a new path different and distinct from the path chosen by the Court in Benson and Flook… In historical terms, the next factual inquiry that presented itself was whether a computer implemented method that transformed data into a readable waveform that could be quickly interpreted was patent eligible. Ultimately, it was wrestling with this scenario that led to the end of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.

Freeman-Walter-Abele: A Tortured History of Software Eligibility

The influence of the thinking behind Freeman-Walter-Abele can also be seen in the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice. Thanks to Alice the focus is now on whether the claims cover an abstract idea or concept, and in order to make the determination we are not supposed to look at the language of the claims, but rather to look through the claims. This causes the apparatus claims to rise and fall with the method claims despite the fact that machines are clearly patent eligible according to the terms of the statute. Further, as the law associated with software developed the industry, with good reason, thought that it would be enough to say that the process steps had to be carried out on a machine (i.e., a computer). That clearly isn’t enough after Alice. While the Supreme Court hasn’t adopted the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, and the current articulation of the test is couched as whether the claims cover only an abstract idea, it does seem that if patent claims could be written to satisfy the moving target of the FWA test then the patent claims should work to satisfy the Alice test that adopts the Mayo framework.

The History of Software Patents in the United States

Software patents have a long history in the United States. Computer implemented processes, or software, has been patented in the United States since 1968… Originally in Benson, the Supreme Court decided that software was not patentable, but then later retracted the blanket prohibition against patenting software in Diehr. The Federal Circuit then spent the better part of two decades trying to figure out under what circumstances software (or computer related processes) should be patented. This seemed to culminate in the 1998 ruling of the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. Unfortunately, the waters were once again made murky as a result of the 2008 ruling by the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski. Some questions were answered when the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Bikski v. Kappos in 2010, notably saying that business methods are patent eligible, but the Supreme Court did not definitively say that software is patent eligible. Then in June 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank, which has for the time being slammed the door shut for many, if not most, software patents.

A Rush to Judgment on Patentable Subject Matter

In the latest decision (“Ultramercial-3”), the panel reached the opposite conclusion and affirmed the dismissal. This apparent turnaround was based on two intervening events: (1) the Supreme Court’s Alice decision in June; and (2) the fact that Chief Judge Rader was no longer on the court, and his place on the panel was taken by Judge Mayer. Much has, and will be, written about the first of these factors, so I would like to focus on the second, and in particular, the diametrically opposed views of Judges Rader and Mayer on a very important procedural issue; namely, whether the lack of patent-eligible subject matter should be a basis for dismissing a case at the outset based only on the “intrinsic” evidence, i.e., the patent itself and its prosecution history in the USPTO, without any discovery, expert testimony and/or claim construction.

A Patent Eligibility in Crisis: A Conversation with Bob Stoll

The Supreme Court is simply not knowledgeable about patent law. And that’s not to say that the Justices couldn’t become knowledgeable, but even in this active state they’re only handling six or eight patent cases a year at most and so a lot of those deal with contracts and that sort of thing. So they’re not ever going to do enough patent cases to develop a specialty. They’re allergic to bright line rules despite the fact that in our space we have 10,000 front line decisions makers between the patent examiners, the Board, the district courts, and the Federal Circuit. You can’t have that many decisions makers without bright line rules, which should be self-evident to anybody including those that went to Ivy League schools and wear black robes. But apparently it’s not.

A Post-Alice Playbook: Practical Strategies for Responding to Alice-Based Rejections

Although the Supreme Court in Alice declined to provide an express definition of “abstract idea,” the opinion is packed with evidence that the Court intended for the term “abstract idea” to apply not to any “abstract idea” in the colloquial sense, but only more specifically to abstract ideas that are fundamental practices long prevalent in their fields… [A]lthough the Court did not provide a definition of “abstract idea,” its reasoning implies that it intended to limit the concept of “abstract ideas” to those concepts which are fundamental and long prevalent, possibly to concepts which have been well-known and extensively used for hundreds of years. An even more narrow, but very reasonable, interpretation of Alice, given the opinion’s strong emphasis on the risk hedging claims in Bilski, the “intermediated settlement” concept allegedly embodied in the claims at issue in Alice, and the repeated references to “economic practices,” “finance class,” “commerce,” and “the modern economy,” is that the Court intended for “abstract ideas” to be limited primarily or entirely to financial methods.

Software Patents are Only as Dead as Schrödinger’s Cat

The environment for patent applicants and examiners that has resulted from such inconsistent treatment of Alice by the USPTO is one in which neither examiners nor applicants have clear guidance about how the USPTO is interpreting and intends to apply the Alice decision. This makes it difficult for examiners to know whether and how to issue Alice-based rejections, and for applicants to know how to respond to such rejections. In this environment, software patents are not dead; instead, they are, like Schrödinger’s cat, in an indeterminate state, simultaneously dead and alive until examined by an observer. In this case, the uncertainty over the impact of Alice on patent prosecution will only be dispelled when the USPTO analyzes the Alice opinion thoroughly and announces the Office’s interpretation of that opinion with a clear and unified voice. At that point, inventors, business owners, patent prosecutors, and patent examiners will be able to return to playing their respective roles within a rational patent system in which all parties involved seek to promote innovation according to fair, clear, and consistently-applied rules.

SCOTUS: Public Enemy Number One for Patent Owners

The consequences of SCOTUS decisions are really severe. The U.S. is no longer a favorable jurisdiction for many biotech patents, medical devices and software. What that’s going to mean is companies are going to move. We’ve known this throughout history. Companies locate where the laws are the best for them. If you’re an innovator you’re going to go where the patent laws are the strongest. And that’s why the U.S. has dominated in these industries. We’re number one in biotech is because of Chakrabarty, which has basically been overruled. Prior to Myriad you would have said the ruling of Chakrabarty was this: if there’s human intervention it’s patent eligible, but now you can’t say that because there was human intervention in Myriad, which they acknowledged, and still the claims were patent ineligible. We know companies will move to jurisdictions with more favorable laws…

Dark Days Ahead: The Patent Pendulum

All of this can really be traced all the way back to the flash of creative genius test by the Supreme Court, which Congress specifically outlawed in the 1952 Patent Act. It is no doubt making a resurgence under slightly different terminology, but make no mistake — Judges are making subjective decisions about innovations in a way that is remarkable similar to how the flash of creative genius test was applied. But today the problem is not only all of the aforementioned, misguided beliefs, but rather we have a general problem with ignorance. It is self evident to anyone who cares to be honest and objective that it takes time and money to innovate; innovation does not simply fall out of the sky or invent itself.

The Patent Drafting Disclosure Revolution: Don’t Ask Alice

No question exists that patent eligibility under Section 101 has been, and remains, the most active question in patent law. Watching the rapid flow of cases back and forth between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court exceeds the excitement generated by most TV shows in sheer entertainment value. The only question open for discussion is whether we are watching “Game of Thrones,” “Survivor”, or “Modern Family.” Actually, the best choice may be “Lost”.

The Broken Patent-Eligibility Test of Alice and Mayo: Why We Urgently Need to Return to Principles of Diehr and Chakrabarty*

Our Judicial Mount Olympus pays, at best, lip-service to Chakrabarty’s observation that, in enacting 35 U.S.C. § 101 in 1952, Congress chose the statutory classes (in Chakrabarty, referring specifically to “composition” and “manufacture” but which would be equally applicable to “apparatus” (i.e., machines) and “process”) to be given an “expansive” and “broad” construction. That command in Chakrabarty would suggest that rulings of patent-ineligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would be the exception, not the rule. By contrast, this unending stream of patent-ineligibility rulings from the lower courts after Alice suggests a serious disconnect, showing no adherence to, or even observance of this command by Chakrabarty to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be “expansively” and “broadly” inclusive, but to be instead very restrictive. As former Chief Judge Rader might characterize it, this restrictive two-part test of Alice has made 35 U.S.C. § 101 not a “coarse screen,” but instead an extremely “narrow funnel.” In other words, the draconian two-part test of Alice was broken from the start.