Posts Tagged: "patent legislation"

In this Part IV, we will discuss the proposal that all interested parties by plaintiffs, the enhanced pleading requirements, limitations on discover and customer stays. While some of these provisions may seem to make sense on their surface, and tailored to provide greater transparency, the reality is that the provisions are extraordinarily burdensome. For example, as written one proposal would require a corporation bringing a patent infringement lawsuit to disclose every stockholder no matter how few shares are owned. Furthermore, by micromanaging patent litigation discretion will be taken away from district court judges while at the same time onerous obligations are placed on small businesses before they can even begin to assert patent infringement, which is problematic because so many entities already knowingly choose to infringe rather than negotiate licenses or engineer around patent rights.

In this Part III, we will discuss the Covered Business Methods (CBM) expansion and the proposed elimination of post grant review estoppel. If these provisions are enacted it will provide greater incentive to challenge granted patents, making serial challenges the new norm. This will substantially and negatively impact small business innovators who will be forced to continually fight to keep the patents they have obtained after having already spent many years during patent prosecution to obtain the rights. This means patent rights will never be more than an expectation and not a true property right. Therefore, if these provisions are enacted it will mean no patent is every truly safe, no title is every quieted, and this will substantially, and negatively, impact investment opportunity and ultimately the commercialization of innovations.

For small business, patents will become mostly unenforceable due to the proposed much higher upfront cost of litigation, thus making small business patents significantly less valuable. Loss of patent value constricts new company formation, chilling new investments, and choking job formation. Legislating disincentives for capital investments will result in the loss of many hundreds of billions of dollars of wealth in America and dry up the major source of new jobs, small inventing businesses… Patents are the number one indicator of regional wealth according to the Federal Reserve Bank… If these “Patent Reform” bills are signed into law, they will discourage small business patents, and the contrapositive indicates that we will be a poorer nation.

Sen. McCaskill introduced S. 2049 in February 2014 which would require the FTC to promulgate rules to prohibit unfair and deceptive acts and practice in the sending of patent demand letters, including requiring each such letter to identify the patent number, the claims, a description of the manufacturer and model number of each accused product or service, notice that the recipient may have the right to have the manufacturer defend against the infringement, the identity of the person with the right to enforce (including each owner, co-owner, assignee, exclusive licensee, and entity with the authority to enforce the patent, and the ultimate parent entity), any FRAND licensing commitments, any basis for a specific license amount, and each PTO proceeding or litigation involving the patent. Bad faith assertion would be enforceable by the FTC or attorney general of a State in federal court.

Opponents of the rule point out that it could lead to unwilling and unnecessary joinder — a point raised particularly by universities and venture capitalists who fear they may be hauled into costly patent litigation against their will if their licensees/startups ever need to enforce their patent rights in court. Still others point to the fact that these joinder provisions would only apply to patent cases — and only against plaintiffs — and would thus create a litigation process unique to patents in district courts. Furthermore, district court judges would lose most of their existing broad discretion to determine whether the facts truly warrant joinder in each unique case.

U.S. patent litigation has followed the centuries-old “American Rule” under which each party to a litigation pays its own legal fees and costs, regardless whether it wins or loses the litigation. A narrow exception exists in patent cases, but only in “exceptional cases” under 35 U.S.C. § 285, such as where the losing party engaged in litigation misconduct, or if the patent was fraudulently procured, or if the losing party raised arguments that were both objectively baseless and made in bad faith. Despite the long tradition of litigants paying their own legal fees and costs, Congress has shown interest in changing the playing field and deviating from the American Rule in patent cases. This comes at a time when the U.S. Supreme Court is already considering two cases that relate to the definition of “exceptional cases” in § 285 that may well alter how this existing exception to the American Rule is applied in practice.

“Today, Congress is under another call to weaken patent protection. This time the alleged culprit is a so-called “patent troll” who, according to some reports, hijacks inventions and while providing no product and therefore no societal value, extorts billions of dollars from the economy. This story could not be further from the truth. The argument is based on highly questionable data. Some of the claims are that patents asserted by so-called “patent trolls” are much weaker than patents asserted by others, that these entities cause billions of dollars of unnecessary cost, and that the number of patent infringement lawsuits has risen dramatically due to the so-called “patent trolls.” All of these assertions are highly disputed.”

GROSSMAN: “I think that we will see some form of patent litigation reform passed by the Senate and then ultimately by Congress. Currently, there are very few things on which the Republicans and the Democrats can come together. However, patents and other types of intellectual property seem to be one area in which joint action is possible. I think that ultimately both parties are going to want to do something that shows that they can work together and get something important accomplished. Enacting the appropriate type of patent litigation reform would foster innovation and create jobs and thereby demonstrate to the American people that they still have a functioning Congress. The House has already passed a bill, and the President urged Congress to pass a bill in his State of the Union address. I think the momentum is there.”

Patents and patent reform has been in the news, even the popular press, on an increasing basis. The issue of patents generally and patent litigation specifically has been the subject of intense debate over the last 8 years. Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, with the bill being signed into law by President Obama on September 16, 2011. The overhaul of U.S. patent law was extraordinary, but not all of the parties involved were happy. Some thought the law went too far in some ways, others thought the law did not go far enough. Despite the AIA being the most significant change to patent laws since at least 1952, Congress is considering further reforms again, with the House of Representatives already passing the Innovation Act (HR 3309). Companion legislation in the Senate is likely to move forward during Q1 2014.

At this time of year we often see many prognostications of what the future holds. From the prospective of the small entity patentee we see big changes in store particularly as some in Congress seem hell-bent on amending the patent statutes once more. These changes are being pushed through without any real consideration for the impact of the changes on patents held by universities, research institutes, small and medium sized companies, emerging companies, independent inventors and new entrepreneurs.

This paper proposes amending 35 U.S.C. 271 Infringement of Patent with elements drawn from § 2-403 of UCC Article 2, Sale of Goods, and with elements of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine. This amendment, if enacted, would prevent patent trolls from proceeding against Bona Fide Purchasers for Value with respect to certain specific infringements, in order to strengthen consumer confidence in the marketplace, by ensuring that vendors can deliver the products that they sell, free of threats of patent infringement litigation against such innocent buyers.

Judge Michel explained legislators are proposing bills because they are being heavily lobbied by a small (but powerful and well-funded) coalition of companies. He highlighted the common problem with the nine active bills currently before Congress. If passed, the bills separately and together would weaken the patent system; not strengthen it. None of these current bills would address the problems with the current patent system: litigation is slow, complicated and unpredictable. The bills, however, would make litigation slower, more complicated and less predictable. In short, congress’ solution would add to the problem.

Instead of condemning NPES, the GAO emphasized at the very outset of its report that our nation’s history is filled with examples of inventors who did not develop products based on the patented technologies… [O]verall, the report directly and indirectly supports the view that there is no patent litigation crisis and that, to the extent that there are problems with the patent system, they are linked primarily to patent quality – not the identity of the patent owner (e.g. NPE, PAE, PME, operating company or whatever name one chooses to use).

A troubling fundamental aspect of the proposed mandatory stay is that it would chip away at the quid pro quo of the patent bargain. To ensure the Constitutionally-protected exclusive right, patent rights have long been recognized as covering multiple and independent separate causes of action: “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (emphasis added). Strict liability attaches to each one of these forms of infringement independently of the others. These are separate violations, any one of which being subject to injunctive relief “to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 283.