Posts Tagged: "Patent Litigation"

During the second quarter of 2017, a total of 1,138 patent cases were filed at the U.S. district court level, an increase of 18 percent when compared to first quarter filings. However, that uptick in patent suits between the first and second quarters of 2017 repeats a trend which has played out since 2013. Compared to the second quarter of 2016, patent case filings were actually down 7 percent on a year-over-year basis. From the beginning of 2016 through the end of 2017, U.S. district courts have seen some of the lowest levels of patent litigation in district courts on a quarterly basis. Interestingly, the Lex Machina update shows a significant decline in case filings in the Eastern District of Texas (E.D. Tex.) correlating strongly with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, a case which restricted the statute on proper venue for patent infringement cases.

In the calculation of design patent infringer profits, two key issues are the definition of the article of manufacture and the methodology for calculating total infringer profits… Depending upon the case, infringer profits may be based on the entire accused product or may be limited to a component of the accused product, but there is no test or guidance at this point for how to determine if the entire product is the article of manufacture or if only a component or certain components comprise the article of manufacture. Therefore, it may be prudent, depending upon the case, to calculate infringer profits based on one or more alternative assumptions as to what the article of manufacture is comprised of in the specific situation. In some cases, the design patent will cover most or all of the product in question but in other cases such as in the Apple case, it will cover only a minor portion of the product.

Two recent cases, The Medicines Co. v. Mylan, Inc and Skedco, Inc. v. Strategic Operations, Inc., illustrate that the patentee’s specification is key to determining whether an alleged infringer has practiced an alternative embodiment or a non-infringing invention… The specifications at issue in Skedco and Medicines took different approaches to the phrasing of example components, and thus led to different results against infringers. The CAFC in Skedco used several example embodiments in the specification to find infringement by a competitor who practiced the invention differently, yet consistent with the available examples. In contrast, the CAFC in Medicines found no infringement by a competitor who practiced a similar process due to a lack of examples and permissive language in the Specification. Through these cases, the CAFC provides two practices for broadening the possible construction of a patent’s claims.

The district court denied a request for a permanent injunction against Metaswitch after a jury found infringement because Genband failed to establish irreparable harm. More specifically, the court found that Genband failed to establish a causal-nexus between infringement and irreparable harm, i.e. that “the patent features drive demand for the product.” The Federal Circuit remanded because this causal-nexus requirement was too stringent. The Federal Circuit explained that the court could not have confidence as to the answer to the causation question under the standard properly governing the inquiry or whether there is any independent ground for the district court finding no irreparable harm or otherwise denying an injunction.

The district court made clearly erroneous factual findings that independently supported reversal. Particularly, the record supported a finding that this case was exceptional given the weakness of AdjustaCam’s litigating position. The evidence offered by AdjustaCam showed that its lawsuit was baseless. However, the district court instead found that AdjustaCam’s litigation position was not exceptional because Newegg’s ball-and-socket products were constrained in such a way that AdjustaCam could reasonably argue that it rotated on a single axis, consistent with the original district judge’s Markman order. But the Court pointed out that AdjustaCam never advanced this argument.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party waives its right to assert a defense of improper venue when it fails to raise the defense in a pleading or with other Rule 12 motions.  Importantly, however, that waiver only takes effect if the defense was “available” to the party at the time of filing either the pleading or motion.  Many circuits, including the Federal Circuit, interpret that requirement by recognizing an intervening law exception to the waiver of a defense, whereby an intervening change in law makes available a defense that had not previously been available.  Does the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland constitute a change in the law?  Was the defense of improper venue unavailable until May 22, 2017?

In a joint stipulation and order entered three claims of patent infringement were dropped in the intellectual property case being fought between San Francisco, CA-based transportation company Uber Technologies and Waymo, one of the subsidiaries of Google-owner Alphabet Inc. The order is one of the most recent filings in a case which has seen hundreds of documents filed since the case began this February. The case is filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (N.D. Cal.).

Only $128,000 collected from a combined 13 cases? That is less than $10,000 per case, which doesn’t even approach the nuisance value the truly bad actors, the true patent trolls that Issa himself and so many others rail against as extortion artists seek to collect. Indeed, the FTC report on Patent Assertion Entities from October 2016 suggested that settlements of less than $300,000 suggested malicious and malevolent behavior that should raise suspicions of patent trolling. If that is true, what does this say about the ongoing enforcement campaign of Issa’s own patents? It would certainly seem that there are all the indicia of patent trolling that Issa so frequently enjoys pontificating about when he witnesses the behavior displayed by others.

Equitable estoppel may be appropriate for the defendant in SCA v. First Quality since the plaintiff was silent for years after the defendant asserted invalidity (possibly fulfilling the misleading conduct through inaction and reliance on that conduct). But can equitable estoppel be relied upon as a defense against a dormant plaintiff in the example illustrated above? Below, we consider the two elements of equitable estoppel that replace the unreasonable delay element of laches: misleading conduct and reliance.

Why is Steven Anderson citing his case as a reason why Congress must create stricter venue rules when he hasn’t even filed a motion to transfer venue? Anderson being trotted out as the poster child for venue reform is curious given he does business in EDTX and is seldom sued. Is this some charade? …. The company has only filed a motion to dismiss based on invalidity of the asserted claims under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. In fact, Culver filed an answer with affirmative defenses three weeks after the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland which notes that “Culver’s does not contest whether personal jurisdiction over it properly lies in this District in this case… Culver’s admits that venue may be proper, but denies that venue is convenient in this District as to Culver’s. Culver’s admits that it conducts business in this District.”

In their recent TC Heartland decision, SCOTUS created unequal protection against patent infringers based on geographical incorporation decisions. They added uncertainty in time, cost, and outcome in patent litigation. Standardized local rules and demand letter reform at the federal level would help mitigate this unfortunate situation… Unless Congress acts to change venue laws, patent owners are now severely restricted in the choice of venue. And, if proposed legislation like S.2733 and the corresponding portion of H.R.9 are any indication, action by Congress may not change much regarding venue. So for now, patent owners must live with the restrictions resulting from TC Heartland.

So obviously the patent claims VirnetX has used to pursue infringers such as Apple and Microsoft are not the weak patents that opponents of the patent system claim are the scourge of the system. Well — not so fast! Just because an Article III federal district court confirms the validity of a patent doesn’t mean anything anymore. Indeed, federal courts have become subordinate to the PTAB, which is as ridiculous as it sounds but sadly true. A patent is not valid until an Article I executive tribunal says so, and absolutely no deference is paid to Article III judges of the United States federal courts.

Partial institutions lessen the value of estoppel because the petitioner avoids estoppel on claims that were challenged but not instituted. The PTAB never issues a final written decision for these challenged-but-not-instituted claims. And because estoppel only applies to claims receiving a final written decision, these non-instituted claims escape the estoppel statute See, e.g., Shaw Industries Group v. Automated Creed Systems, 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In effect, the PTAB’s current practice saves a petitioner from estoppel on claims it had little chance of invalidating. Thus, under the current practice, a petitioner currently only risks estoppel on claims that it stands a good chance of invalidating. But if the Supreme Court decides as expected, estoppel will attach to all challenged claims of an instituted IPR. Final written decisions will more often include claims found valid, and a petitioner will no longer be able to avoid estoppel for some claims by relying on the PTAB to sort strong challenges from weak ones at the institution stage.

The Cleveland Clinic’s diagnostic or “testing” patents at issue dealt with a process by which an enzyme was measured and correlated against known levels of the enzyme in patients who were healthy or had cardiovascular disease. The Federal Circuit applied the two step Alice analysis, affirming a finding of Section 101 ineligibility and a failure by plaintiff to state a claim of contributory or induced infringement.