Posts Tagged: "patentability requirements"

David Kappos, the director of the USPTO under President Obama from 2009 to 2013, recently called for congress to repeal section 101 of the patent act. According to Kappos, the current chaotic “I know it when I see it” 101 test that must be somehow consistently applied by thousands of USPTO examiners and hundreds of judges, means American inventors are better off seeking protection in China and Europe. While America “is providing less protection than other countries”, European countries are “putting their foot down in favor of innovation”.

Jericho’s access control model was first used as the blueprint for the Department of Defense Global Information grid in 2007. The software was later deployed across two Department of Defense secure network enterprises, providing access control to over six million persons and entities. Five years later, President Obama mandated the use of this model in every U.S. Government enterprise. The district court found the patent claims to be patent ineligible under the abstract idea doctrine, saying it did not matter that the system operated faster and more efficiently. The Federal Circuit affirmed without opinion in a Rule 36 summary affirmance.

Essentially, the Supreme Court told the Federal Circuit that they needed remedial reading lessons. The statute is clear: “may” means district courts have discretion. The Supreme Court also seemed instruct the Federal Circuit to stop making stuff up that clearly isn’t found within the statute. It is truly ironic, even downright funny, how the Supreme Court can so clearly see that the Federal Circuit is not being true to the simple, easy to understand, straight-forward terms of a statute but at the same time lack the capacity to similarly see that they are themselves doing the very same thing. If intellectual honesty means anything the Supreme Court would hold themselves to the same standard and stop applying judicial exceptions to patent eligibility that enjoy no textual support in the statute.

Unfortunately, §102, §103, and §112 issues can and do get wrapped into the court’s §101 reasoning, thus resulting in opinions with no differentiation. In the end, courts are forcing a round peg into a square hole when they seek to turn the patentability test into a single factor test analyzed under §101. Such a reworking of the patentability test is contrary to what the Supreme Court said in Diehr, and it violates the statutes passed by Congress. In essence, the courts are legislating from the bench when they consider novelty, obviousness and description under §101. So if you are confused by why decisions are relying on §101 when other sections of the statute seem far better suited you are not alone.

What makes the Enfish case particularly interesting is that the court found that the software patent at issue was not even an abstract idea. As such, the inquiry as to patent eligibility did not proceed beyond the abstract idea analysis step. Basically the Enfish court used the wording in Alice to refute post-Alice perceptions that all improvements in computer related technology and/or software inventions are inherently abstract and therefore “are only properly analyzed at the second step of the Alice analysis.” Enfish at 11. This interpretation represents what could be a meaningful shift in the interpretation of software patent validity.

Enfish bothers me. The Federal Circuit decision puts forth some great phrases, but I am concerned that Enfish will not be as useful as hoped in overcoming §101 Alice rejections. The patents at stake in Enfish appear to have been written with a confident view of the prior art and of the invention. So, if a specification does not confidently emphasize the “invention,” its “benefits over” conventional prior art, and “disparage” the prior art, will examiners and judges continue Step 1 characterizations at “such a high level of abstraction”? Is Enfish merely much ado about nothing?

On its face, the new guidance seems to urge examiners to develop well-reasoned, substantive rejections rather than conclusory rejections which provide little basis for applicants to advance applications toward allowance, particularly in the complex areas of vaccines, diagnostics, methods of treatment, and screening for genetic alterations, where the new examples are focused. Furthermore, compared with prior guidance, the new examples include more claims that are considered patent eligible subject matter. Some observers believe this may be an effort by the patent office to dispel hesitation that examiners have apparently had in drawing conclusions of patent eligibility when examining claims.

In March 2016, Vehicle Intelligence filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court arguing that the two-part Alice test is “a universal pesticide to kill and invalidate virtually all patents.” Vehicle Intelligence has posed the following questions: (1) whether the Mayo/Alice test states that use or application of an abstract idea is automatic, conclusive proof of preemption of the abstract idea; (2) whether the Mayo/Alice test requires that any patent which improves on technology existing in the prior art to be retaught in a vacuum in order to present inventive concepts to satisfy the second step of the Mayo/Alice test; and (3) whether a patent would satisfy the second step of the Mayo/Alice test by having independent claims that include multiple explicitly-stated inventive concepts.

Earlier today the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) declined to institute a covered business method (CBM) review of U.S. Patent No. 6,006,227, which is owned by Mirror World Technologies, LLC. The decision is significant not only because the PTAB refused to institute a covered business method review, but because the panel — Administrative Patent Judges Thomas Giannetti, David McKone, and Barbara Parvis — cited the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Enfish v. Microsoft when they found that the challenged claims of the ‘227 patent were not abstract.

Congress can, and should, take at least four steps in restoring the health and vitality of our patent system: First, Congress should ensure that the patent grant is meaningful and valuable in the first instance. Second, Congress should reaffirm the exclusive nature of the patent grant. Third, Congress should clarify, and perhaps legislatively overrule, the cases addressing patent eligible subject matter, Alice, Mayo, and Myriad. Fourth, and finally, Congress should tread extremely carefully in the realm of so-called patent litigation reform.

Where the claims are directed to an improvement to computer functionality, they are not abstract under the first step of Alice, and thus no step-two analysis is necessary. Here, the Federal Circuit found that Enfish’s self-referential table was directed to a specific improvement in computer capabilities, unlike Alice, where the claimed technology only added a computer to a traditional business practice. For this reason, the Court held that Enfish’s claims were not abstract under the first step of Alice, and therefore did not warrant the application of step two.

Bahr tells examiners that based on the Federal Circuit ruling they “may determine that a claim direct to improvements in computer-related technology is not direct to an abstract idea under Step 2A of the subject matter eligibility examination guidelines (and is thus patent eligible), without the need to analyze the additional elements under Step 2B.” (emphasis in the original) Bahr goes on to tell examiners that a claim that is “directed to an improvement to computer-related technology (e.g., computer functionality) is likely not similar to claims that have been previously identified as abstract by the courts.”

On May 6, 2016, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office released new life science examples on subject matter eligibility (Examples 28-32, consecutively numbered after the previously released USPTO examples). Examples 28 and 30 illustrate the application of the “markedly different” and “significantly more” analysis to nature-based products. Examples 29 and 31 illustrate the USPTO approach to the eligibility analysis of diagnostic claims, which has been much anticipated. Finally, Examples 32 and 33 illustrate the use of a streamlined eligibility analysis. At first glance, the new life science examples, which identify most of the presented hypothetical claims as patent-eligible, provide several teaching points for achieving patent-eligibility in commonly encountered situations in the life sciences area.

From there the Federal Circuit said: ”We do not read Alice to broadly hold that all improvements in computer-related technology are inherently abstract and, therefore, must be considered at step two. Indeed, some improvements in computer-related technology when appropriately claimed are undoubtedly not abstract, such as a chip architecture, an LED display, and the like. Nor do we think that claims directed to software, as opposed to hardware, are inherently abstract and therefore only properly analyzed at the second step of the Alice analysis. Software can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can be accomplished through either route.”

Earlier this month, attorneys and patent practitioners from all over the nation, and far corners of the globe, descended upon Bethesda, Maryland for the 31st Annual Intellectual Property Law Conference of the American Bar Association (ABA). A panel of three distinguished practitioners, Tim Bedard of Visa, Eric Sutton of Oracle, and Gene Quinn, debated The Post-Alice Landscape. The presentation included…