Posts Tagged: "patentability requirements"

Artificial Intelligence Can’t Patent Inventions: So What?

The USPTO’s recent landmark decision (16/524,350) concluding artificial intelligence (AI) cannot be a named patent inventor perhaps sparked fears of super-robots inventing critical technologies that, alas, receive no patent protection. If an AI identifies new, more efficient battery chemicals, will that new battery be unpatentable? If an AI builds chemical compounds that become the next wonder drug, will that drug-maker…

An Emerging Section 101 Expansion to Section 112(a) Enablement? The Federal Circuit Should Stop It Now

The most dominant, divisive issue in patent law over the last decade—Section101-eligibility and the Supreme Court’s Mayo-Alice framework—appears to have just become more divisive. Indeed, at least part of the reason for the controversy is that, with Mayo-Alice as the governing test, courts as a preliminary matter can decide Section101-eligibility based on considerations of an “inventive concept” and patentability—issues the Court once declared were “not relevant” to the separate eligibility provision of the Patent Act. Be that as it may, the Federal Circuit has recently issued certain decisions indicating that Section 101 now incorporates another vast area of invalidity; viz., the requirements for “enablement” under 35 U.S.C. §112(a). See, e.g., Customedia Technologies, LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. March 6, 2020). In this article, we examine how this new requirement for Section 101 has emerged, the recent precedent on the issue, and the Patent Act’s requirements that undermine such Section 112(a) considerations for a Section 101-eligibilty test.

Federal Circuit Upholds Patent for Biologic Drug Enbrel; Judge Reyna Dissents

On July 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed a holding of the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in Immunex Corporation, Amgen Manufacturing, Limited, Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., Sandoz International GMBH, Sandoz GMBH, holding that Sandoz failed to prove that the asserted claims were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting (ODP), failure to meet the written description requirement, and obviousness for lack of motivation to combine the prior art references. The ruling for now blocks Sandoz from marketing its biosimilar version (Erelzi) of the popular rheumatoid arthritis drug, Enbrel. Judge Reyna dissented, arguing that certain clauses of the licensing agreement were illusory, thereby rendering the agreement an effective assignment for purposes of ODP.

Bilski and Its Expansion of the Abstract Idea Exception: A Failure to Define

The Supreme Court’s Bilski v. Kappos decision—which celebrated its 10th birthday this past weekend—still matters, even in the age of Mayo-Alice. For one thing, the case marked the end of the patent-eligibility peace. For another, Bilski stands for the well-known principle that the “machine-or-transformation” test offers a “useful and important clue” as to whether the process claimed by a patent will qualify as patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. §101. And at the same time, it stands for the fact that the machine-or-transformation test has been far more trivia than principle, the case law not having applied or considered that Bilski “clue” much beyond the Bilski case itself.

Federal Circuit Agrees with PTAB that Firebug’s Footwear Claims Are Obvious

On June 25, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed an appeal from two final written decisions of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) in Shoes By Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Group, LLC, wherein the CAFC held that the PTAB did not err in concluding that the claims of two patents owned by Shoes by Firebug (Firebug) were obvious in view of the prior art.