Posts Tagged: "prior art"

The Court found the Board’s reliance on Woodland Trust to be “misplaced” because in that case there had been continued public use for a period of a decade without any documentary evidence to support conception. To the contrary, on the facts presented here there was some documentation over the period of several months. Furthermore, that documentation took place nearly twenty years ago, which according to the Court wrote made this situation far closer to Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Electric, 266 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In Loral Fairchild the Court previously “forgave the inventor’s inability ‘to submit documents showing production test results, considering that the events at issue occurred almost 30 years ago’” — when the inventor’s account was otherwise adequately corroborated. Additionally, there was no one else suggested by either party as the actual inventor.

The Court found that the Board did not provide an adequate explanation for finding that the “30%” limitation was inherent in the reference, as a predicate for its holding of obviousness. Nevertheless, the Board “made the necessary underlying factual findings to support an obviousness determination.”  Specifically, the reference disclosed the same process for manufacturing electric cables, the steps did not differ in any material way, and there were no unexpected results. The Court also pointed to precedent that shifts the burden to the patentee. “[W]here all process limitations are expressly disclosed by the prior art reference, except for the functionally expressed limitation at issue, the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on.”

The Federal Circuit reversed. Indeed, it found that the Board committed legal error by improperly relying on inherency to find obviousness and in its analysis of motivation to combine the references. The court found that the Board erred in relying on inherency to dismiss evidence showing unpredictability in the art in rejecting Honeywell’s argument that a skilled artisan would not have been motivated to combine the references with a reasonable expectation of success. It referred to an earlier opinion [citations omitted] to state that “the use of inherency in the context of obviousness must be carefully circumscribed because “[t]hat which may be inherent is not necessarily known” and that which is unknown cannot be obvious.”

Boulder, CO-based shoe manufacturer Crocs, Inc. (NASDAQ:CROX) had a design patent rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The patent struck by the USPTO is U.S. Patent No. D517789. Issued in March 2006 and assigned to Crocs, it protected the ornamental design of footwear. The design patent illustrations attached to the ‘789 design patent showcase the well-known Crocs design featuring holes in the footwear material around the front of the foot and a strap behind to hold the footwear in place against a person’s heel… The Examiner refused to recognize a priority claims of earlier filed applications dating back to June 23, 2003. According to the Examiner, the shoe that is the subject of the ‘789 design patent was not adequately disclosed prior to May 28, 2004, making an earlier priority date claim impossible to recognize.

Although the distinction between inherency in obviousness and anticipation is sometimes blurred, the two concepts are quite different and a claim may be inherently anticipated without being inherently obvious.  This could happen if the missing and unknown limitation were to flow naturally from the teachings of the prior art, and yet not be predictedable… A major difference between having knowledge of the missing limitation versus not having it is that the knowledge can provide the motivation to combine prior art references. 

Essentially, §102 requires the patent applicant to demonstrate that the invention is new. In essence, in order for a claimed invention to violate this “newness” requirement it must be exactly identical to the prior art… In order to understand the requirements of §102 it will be helpful to explore the concept of anticipation in detail. A claim is said to be “anticipated” if comparison of the claimed invention with a prior art reference reveals that each and every element in the claim under attack is shown or described, organized, and functioning in substantially the same manner as in the prior art reference.

Earlier today the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a major decision interpreting provisions of the America Invents Act (AIA), specifically the AIA on-sale bar provisions. In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit panel of Judges Dyk, Mayer and O’Malley determined: “after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is…

The patent process can be expensive, so the last thing you want to do is spend a lot of money preparing and filing an application when there is easy to find knock-out prior art that will prevent a patent, or at the very least make any patent that is obtained extremely narrow. For this reason many choose to begin the patent process with a patent search, but many others will forego a patent search and simply file a patent application. The problem, however, is that everything winds up being described as equally important when experience teaches that will not be the case. Proceeding without a search is particularly problematic today given the likelihood that any valuable patent will be challenged in a post grant proceeding at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. Getting rights you have confidence in has to be the name of the game.

Rembrandt sued Samsung for patent infringement in the Eastern District of Texas and convinced a jury that Samsung infringed its two asserted patents, awarding $15.7 million in damages. Samsung appealed claim construction, denial of JMOL of obviousness, a Daubert motion on a damages expert, and the refusal to limit damages. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s claim construction and its denial of Samsung’s JMOL motions, affirming those decisions… The Federal Circuit vacated because allowing Rembrandt to “avoid the consequence of its failure to mark undermines the marking statute’s public notice function.” The Federal Circuit remanded to the district court to properly limit damages, and also remanded the question of whether the marking statute applies on a patent-by-patent or claim-by-claim basis because the parties had not squarely addressed the issue during the present appeal.

On January 3, 2017 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the court) handed down two decisions relating to obviousness under § 103 – In re: Marcel Van Os, Freddy Allen Anzures, Scott Forstall, Greg Christie, Imran Chaudhri, No. 2015-1975 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Van Os) and In re: Ethicon, Inc., No. 2015-1696 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Ethicon). In Van Os, the Appellants appealed a decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) affirming the Examiner’s rejection of the claims of U.S. Patent Application No. 12/364,470 under § 103. The court addressed the question of whether the PTAB properly held that the claims were obvious in light of prior art. The court vacated and remanded. In Ethicon, the Appellant appealed a decision from the PTAB affirming, in a merged inter partes reexamination, the Examiner’s rejection of the claims of U.S. patent 7,591,844 (the ’844 patent) under § 103. The court addressed the question of whether the PTAB properly affirmed the rejection of the claims of the ’844 patent under § 103. The court affirmed. These two cases raise several interesting questions, especially given that they were decided on the same day.

The Federal Circuit noted that precedent requires a prior art reference to disclose the invention without modification in order to anticipate. “[A] prior art reference that must be distorted from its obvious design does not anticipate a patent claim.” The Court applied that principle here and found that the first reference (Rambert) would only anticipate if one of its elements was removed. The Board failed to explain the removal of that element. The second reference (Bouttens) also required “significant and impermissible modification,” which was also unexplained. Consequently, the Board’s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence.

The problem-solution paradigm has become a cornerstone of patentability in Europe. If the invention cannot be reduced to the format of a technical solution to a technical problem, this could be a sign that either the supposed invention is non-technical, or the contribution over the state of the art is non-technical. In Europe, non technical inventions are excluded much in the same way as abstract ideas are deemed non-patent eligible in the US. Inventions that make no technical contribution are refused for obviousness. The EPC and the subsequent case law do not have a precise definition of what is technical (non-abstract) and non-technical (abstract). Nevertheless there is a growing body of case law on inventions which involve a mix of technical features and non technical features and that are refused for lack of inventive step because the non-technical features are disregarded.

There is a plausible case that the US law on obviousness is indeed compatible with the EPO problem-and-solution approach. It could even be said that the steps of the problem-and-solution approach appear to have been inspired by US law and practice! Under present working styles, USPTO examiners concentrate on the claims and spend little or no time reading the description. If they are to initiate obviousness rejections using the problem-and-solution format they would have to change habits and consult the description to locate any effects related to the distinguishing features.

European practice requires a strict distribution of the features before and after “characterizing”, where those prior art features that are common with the definition of the invention must be included in the pre-characterizing part. A useful way of thinking about a 2-part claim is that, schematically, the pre-characterizing part, taken alone, is a claim that covers the invention but is so broad that it covers also the closest prior art. This broad definition is followed by a characterizing part that specifies the features that confer novelty to the entire claim. Thus, the pre-characterizing part is is not a definition of the prior art but is a non-novel definition of the invention.

In a handful of IPRs, the Petitioner has relied on a video, and asserted that the video constitutes a printed publication… One factor raised in these cases is the mode by which the video was distributed. Two different modes can be identified: a first in which the video was actively distributed on a physical medium such as a CD; and a second in which the video was passively accessible as by availability on the internet.