Posts Tagged: "standard essential patents"

To those of us who breathe intellectual property and innovation, it sounds so obvious to say that consumers benefit greatly from the dynamic competition inventions and IP bring forth:  new products, technologies and industrial sectors. However, many who breathe antitrust hold a different perspective — it presumes a patent confers market power, that commercialization amounts to anticompetitive conduct and that the right to exclude is equivalent to monopolization by incumbent players in a static market. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Makan Delrahim, who left the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) with the changeover of administrations, bridged this gulf. Delrahim achieved this due to his background as both patent attorney and antitrust lawyer. Delrahim offered a framework he calls the New Madison Approach. The New Madison Approach advanced through the division’s amicus program.

Courts around the world have determined appropriate methodologies for calculating damages on standard essential patents (SEPs) for which patent holders have made an assurance to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Determinations of patent holdup, licensee holdout, use of worldwide portfolio licensing, incremental value rule, etc. are included in these decisions. The court determines damages based on the below-referenced judgments and FRAND terms when reviewing SEP infringements. Under most patent laws, infringement damages are set based on factors including actual loss due to infringement, if the actual loss is difficult to determine, gains of the infringer, and if both actual loss and gains are not available—determination of appropriate multiples of a reasonable royalty fee. 

This is the fifth and final article in a series of articles analyzing statements made by various entities in the cellular industry regarding licensing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) basis. The fourth article focused on the obligations of SEP owners in the process of FRAND licensing. This article considers the obligations of implementers.

A wave of thousands of 5G Self-Declared Standard Essential Patents (SD-SEPs) applicable to everything from devices to network infrastructure is fast approaching. The value of these patents is 6-10% of the retail product value, if recent LTE SEPs court decisions are to be believed. However, ex ante 5G licensing rates announced by traditional licensors Qualcomm, Ericsson, Nokia, and Interdigital total around $18 (or 3.6%) on a $500 handset. Yet these licensors hold less than 17.4% of the relevant 5G SD-SEP families, which would make the total royalty burden 20% or higher. Implementers faced with high SEP licensing cost and uncertainty typically mitigate risk by: (1) using licensed components, (2) receiving indemnification, and (3) leveraging defensive portfolios. But there is another strategy that should be considered given the tools which are now available: preemptively challenging patent family validity in foreign jurisdictions that are relatively quick, inexpensive and often more effective.

During a recent panel discussion at IP Watchdog’s SEP 2020 Conference, a question arose as to the difference, if any, between a reasonable royalty for infringement of a U.S. patent and a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) rate for licensing standards essential patents (SEPs). The following discusses this question and highlights some recent related judicial developments. According to an article titled “The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies”, appearing in the Utah Law Faculty Scholarship (hereinafter “Contreas et al.”), “there appears to be nothing in U.S. law that compels courts to utilize either the Georgia-Pacific framework, or patent damages law in general, to determine royalties complying with an SEP holder’s FRAND commitment”. The authors further note that “these two concepts (patent damages and FRAND royalty rates) arose via different historical pathways and are intended to achieve different goals”; the former being rooted in statutes and case law, the latter being contractual in origin.

This is the fourth in a series of articles analyzing statements made by various entities in the cellular industry regarding licensing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) basis. The third article considered the royalty base to which FRAND rates apply. This article focuses on statements made regarding the obligations of SEP owners in the process of FRAND licensing.

This is the third in a series of articles analyzing statements made by various entities in the cellular industry regarding licensing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) basis. The previous article considered unconditional offers to license on a FRAND basis, arbitration of FRAND terms and conditions, specific FRAND rates, the application of such rates, and portfolio licensing. This article focuses on statements regarding the FRAND royalty base.

On day one of IPWatchdog’s SEP2020, keynote speaker David Kappos told IPWatchdog President and CEO Gene Quinn that the IP community should not panic about what a Biden administration might mean for standard essential patents (SEPs), or IP more broadly. “I have reason to believe we could see a positive continuation of what we’ve seen in recent years,” Kappos said. “President-Elect Biden comes from a background where he under[stands] IP. I worked with him on IP issues under the first Obama administration and he demonstrated an appreciation for the balance that involves intellectual property. He comes from a state – Delaware – that means business about IP, with a strong specialty chemicals industry in that state, and a strong patent jurisprudence.” Additionally, Biden would have people like Senator Chris Coons (D-DE), who has been “an extremely strong advocate for strong intellectual property,” around him. “I have a tremendous faith in [Coons] as a force for making sure we continue going in the right direction,” Kappos added.

In a previous article, we laid out the basics of “patent pools”, which license patents that are declared essential for technology standards. A recent article published in the University of San Diego Law Review, titled Glory Days: Do the Anticompetitive Risks of Standards-Essential Patent Pools Outweigh Their Procompetitive Benefits? (Glory Days), criticized patent pools, alleging inefficiencies and anticompetitive risks of pools for standard essential patents (SEPs). While the authors make several rebuttable suggestions, the crux of the authors’ complaints about SEP patent pools is that SEP pools should bear all the burdens and expenses of verifying with a litigation-grade level of certainty that all patents in the pool are essential and valid before an implementer will even engage in a licensing discussion with the pool. This approach is not economically or practically realistic and is designed to justify hold out and provide cover for implementers to refuse to engage in licensing discussions.

Implementers of standard essential technology such as Long-Term Evolution (LTE) are constantly attempting to reduce costs for implementation. This behavior has led to certain inefficiencies in the marketplace, such as innovators not being compensated for their contributions to technological standards. The symbiotic relationship between innovators and implementers cannot continue where one side takes all the risk and the other side reaps all the reward. One construct put in place by innovators to extract compensation from the marketplace are patent pools that license patents that are declared essential for technology standards.

Over the years, several entities have published statements related to licensing 4G/5G cellular wireless Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) on a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) basis.  These include entities that are primarily licensors of SEPs, entities who sell network equipment products or components and who are also significant licensors of SEPs, entities who sell end user products and who are significant licensees of SEPs, an association focused on FRAND policy development and a patent pool.  An analysis of these statements reveals several common themes, but also a wide range of opinions on such issues. Below is the first in a series of articles that will review these statements with a view to highlighting some of these differing viewpoints, and provides context for these statements by way of reference to the policies of standards setting organizations and related legal pronouncements.

On August 4, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed a decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware in Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Commc’n Tech, wherein the district court held that TCL was liable for infringement by way of its sale of LTE standard-compliant devices…. The CAFC initially said that it agreed with the district court’s ruling and reasoning, but wrote to address a question not before addressed by the CAFC case law: “who determines the standard-essentiality of the patent claims at issue—the court, as part of claim construction, or the jury, as part of its infringement analysis?”

In withdrawing the 2013 statement, the new 2019 guidance by the DOJ, NIST and the USPTO states the obvious, i.e. that there is no difference in the law between F/RAND assured standard essential patents and all other patents. While some would have perhaps liked to break the unitarity approach of the patent system so as to weaken remedies against the infringement of essential patents, a legal system that would apply a different standard to standard essential patents as opposed to other patents would violate U.S. trade obligations.

Earlier this afternoon, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (DOJ), issued a Joint Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (“2019 Joint Policy Statement”). This Joint Policy Statement explains that “[c]onsistent with the prevailing law… injunctive relief, reasonable…

Several weeks ago, the International Trade Commission (ITC) announced that Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Charles Bullock issued a Notice of Initial Final Determination recommending that certain memory modules manufactured and imported by SK Hynix, Inc. and its subsidiaries should be excluded from importation into the United States. As is common with these announcements, the ITC first released a one-page indication of the decision, which was followed by the redacted full decision once the parties had an opportunity to request redaction of trade secrets and confidential information. The full decision has now been released, and the ITC is asking for comments relating to public interest issues from the parties, interested persons, and other government agencies and departments.