Posts Tagged: "summary judgment"

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) today issued a precedential opinion affirming a district court order that struck parts of an infringement expert report and also granted summary judgment of non-infringement to Valve Corporation. The CAFC held that it is proper to strike expert testimony that did not rely on the agreed upon claim construction adopted by the district court. Treehouse Avatar, LLC owns U.S. Patent 8,180,858, which relates to a method of presenting data based on choices made by users with respect to characters in a network site, such as choosing clothing and hairstyles for the characters. The case turned on the meaning of “character-enabled (CE) network sites” (“CE limitation”) in the claims, which the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) had construed in an earlier inter partes review (IPR) proceeding to mean “a network location, other than a user device, operating under control of a site program to present a character, object, or scene to a user interface.”

On August 6, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision in Boigris v. EWC P&T, LLC in which the appellate court affirmed a ruling by the Southern District of Florida granting summary judgment to EWC, the owner of the nationwide European Wax Center chain of beauty salons, on cybersquatting claims filed against the owner of several GoDaddy domains that were registered in bad faith to profit from EWC’s stores. Although the majority found that the accused domain names and EWC’s registered trademarks were confusingly similar in sight, sound and meaning, the dissent raises interesting questions regarding the proper standard on confusing similarity at the summary judgment stage.

On March 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) vacated and reversed the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant Munchkin, Inc. (Munchkin) for noninfringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 8,899,420 (the ‘420 patent) and 6,974,029 (the ‘029 patent), held by plaintiffs Edgewell Personal Care Brands, LLC and International Refills Company, Ltd. (collectively Edgewell). Edgewell manufactures and sells the Diaper Genie, a diaper pail system with two main components: 1) a pail for collection of soiled diapers; and 2) a replaceable cassette within the pail that forms a wrapper around the soiled diapers. The ‘420 and ‘029 patents relate to improvements in the cassette design. Edgewell filed suit against Munchkin for infringement of these patents for selling refill cassettes marketed as being compatible with Edgewell’s Diaper Genie. Edgewell appealed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Munchkin for noninfringement of both patents.

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued a precedential public opinion affirming the District Court for the District of Delaware’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement for Donghee America, Inc. and Donghee Alabama, LLC (Donghee). The CAFC held that the summary judgment ruling was consistent with the claim construction and supported by the facts on the record. A sealed opinion was delivered on November 21.

The plaintiff, Plastic Omnium Advanced Innovation and Research (Plastic Ominum), owns two patents for blow molding plastic fuel tanks, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,814,921 (‘921) and 6,866,812 (‘812). The patents outline a system to manufacture the tanks in a manner that allows accessory components to be installed without damaging or removing part of the tank’s wall. The ‘812 patent describes a method in which a hollow plastic tube, called a parison, is extruded, formed, and then cut by a blade at the exit of the extruder. The dispute arises out of the ‘921 patent’s description of an “extruded parison” limitation.

On November 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed a decision of the District of Nevada granting summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Pharma Tech Solutions, Inc. (Pharma Tech) sued LifeScan, Inc. (LifeScan) for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,153,069 (the ‘069 patent) and 6,413,411 (the ‘411 patent). The patents are directed toward home use, blood glucose monitoring systems for individuals with diabetes. Previous monitoring systems determined blood glucose concentration from the Cottrell current drawn and measured from a patient’s oxidized blood sample. The specification of the ‘069 and ‘411 patents claims to improve on these systems by “eliminating several of the critical operator dependent variables that adversely affect the accuracy and reliability” of the previous systems. The invention performs multiple Cottrell current measurements (opposed to just the one) and converts these into analyte concentrations. It then compares the results for better accuracy, notifying the user if the results fall outside of an acceptable range of each other to indicate a system error. Ultimately, the CAFC found that because LifeScan’s meter does not convert diffusion limiting current readings to analyte concentration measurements and then compare the measurements to detect errors, and because Pharma Tech is barred in its infringement argument by prosecution history estoppel, LifeScan did not infringe Pharma Tech’s ‘069 or ‘411 patents.

U.S. District Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon of the Eastern District of Louisiana entered a preliminary injunction order against Jolie Home, LLC and other defendants accused of trademark infringement by Annie Sloan Interiors, the U.K.-based makers of Annie Sloan® Chalk Paint®. The preliminary injunction orders the defendants to cease their “reverse passing off” of Annie Sloan® products as Jolie Home products and their distribution of advertisements and labels for Jolie Home paints which claim to use the same formula as Annie Sloan® Chalk Paint® and used the trademarked phrase “chalk paint” in a non-fair use manner.

In Berkheimer and Aatrix, the Federal Circuit indicated that although patent eligibility under Section 101 is ultimately a question of law, the determination may have factual underpinnings that, at least in some cases, render it inappropriate for motions to dismiss or for summary judgment… However, following Berkheimer and Aatrix, the Federal Circuit has itself affirmed numerous Section 101 rulings that were made at the dismissal or pleadings stage. This article provides a summary of recent district court decisions granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss under Section 101.

The Qualcomm decision is unique in that it appears to be the first decision to require a SEP holder to license its patented technology to its competitors, and not just its downstream customers, on FRAND terms.  This decision casts doubt on the longstanding practice, common in industries such as the telecommunication and automotive industries, in which SEP holders seek to secure “FRAND” licenses with downstream companies that make finished products, while refusing to license (or licensing on non-FRAND terms) those same SEPs to their competitors or other companies further up the supply chain (such as component suppliers).  The decision also emphasizes U.S. courts’ focus on the express language of SSOs’ IPR policies and the willingness to review the SSO guidelines in interpreting the agreements SEP holders enter into with SSOs.  In this regard, the decision may bode well for SEP implementers, given the court’s broad understanding of what it means to “practice” a relevant standard and its view that SEP holders’ FRAND obligations extend to all potential licensees, irrespective of their position in the supply chain.

On Sunday, September 30th, U.S. District Judge Alison J. Nathan of the Southern District of New York signed a memorandum opinion and order that was officially entered the following day in a trademark case brought by pop music superstar Beyoncé Giselle Knowles-Carter against Feyonce, Inc., a developer of merchandise marketed to engaged people using the brand name Feyoncé. Although the court found no dispute that the mark “FEYONCÉ” was chosen with the intent to capitalize on the famous “BEYONCÉ” mark, Beyoncé’s motion for a permanent injunction couldn’t be granted on summary judgment because there remains a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether a jury would find that a rational consumer would mistakenly believe an affiliation between the two brands.

District Judge Stefan Underhill of the District of Connecticut issued a ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment in a copyright case involving the cult horror film Friday the 13th. Judge Underhill’s ruling determined that Victor Miller, the screenwriter who wrote the script for the movie, did not produce the script as a work made for hire, thus preserving his ability to claim ownership of the copyright for the script.

On Wednesday, August 15th, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc. which upheld a decision by the district court to invalidate patent claims owned by BSG Tech as patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Federal Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Jimmie Reyna, Evan Wallach and Todd Hughes found that the district court correctly determined that patent claim asserted by BSG Tech were invalid as abstract ideas lacking any inventive step under the Alice/Mayo framework… The only allegedly unconventional feature of BSG Tech’s claims was the requirement that users are guided by summary comparison usage information, which was simply a restatement of the abstract idea identified under the first step of Alice/Mayo

The Lex Machina report supports the notion that trade secret litigation has ramped up in U.S. district courts in the time since the passage of the DTSA. Between 2009 and 2016, trade secret suit filings generally remained within a range of 860 cases per year and 930 cases per year. In 2017, however, U.S. trade secret case filings saw an increase up to 1,134 cases filed. Through the first half of 2018, 581 trade secret cases have been filed, putting this year on pace to slightly exceed the number of trade secret cases filed in 2017.

On June 20th, U.S. District Judge Mark Walker of the Northern District of Florida issued an order on summary judgment which terminated Pohl v. Officite, a copyright infringement case, before it headed to trial. The order, which contains about as much legal precedent as it does puns and wordplay, reflects the judge’s determination that before-and-after images of dental work do not meet the threshold of creativity required to establish copyright protection for the photos.

A casual observer may read the Aatrix dissent, or cases cited therein, to say it is improper to consider extrinsic evidence.  In particular, the dissent quotes Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873 F.3d 905, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2017), which says “[T]his court has determined claims to be patent-ineligible at the motion to dismiss stage based on intrinsic evidence from the specification without need for ‘extraneous fact finding outside the record.’”.  But Secured Mail is itself quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613–14 (Fed. Cir. 2016), where the court found it unnecessary to look outside the record because the patent itself admitted so much of the claimed invention employed well-known technology.  Neither Secured Mail nor TLI explicitly prohibited a patentee from relying on extrinsic evidence, especially where the specification does not admit the technology is conventional.