Posts Tagged: "writ of mandamus"

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) today issued an order denying MaxPower Semiconductor, Inc.’s appeal and Petition for Writ of Mandamus with respect to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (PTAB’s) decisions to institute ROHM Semiconductor USA, Inc.’s petitions for four inter partes review (IPR) proceedings of MaxPower patents. The five-page Order was authored by Judge Reyna over a 17-page partial dissent by Judge O’Malley. The majority first explained that a decision to institute IPR is non-appealable under 35 U.S.C. §314(d), which plainly “confirms the unavailability of jurisdiction” for the CAFC to hear the direct appeals. Section 314(d) also presents a challenge to the mandamus petition, said the court, because MaxPower did not meet the criteria necessary to invoke the “collateral order doctrine.”

On August 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a decision in In re: DISH Network L.L.C. in which the appellate court denied a petition for mandamus relief stemming from another appeal of a denial to transfer venue entered by U.S. District Judge Alan D. Albright of the Western District of Texas. Although the Federal Circuit avoided the entry of mandamus relief directing Judge Albright to grant Dish Network’s motion to transfer, the appellate court voiced its expectation that Judge Albright “will expeditiously reconsider this matter before resolving substantive issues” in the patent infringement suit filed by interactive TV and video-on-demand (VOD) provider Broadband iTV.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in In re Samsung today granted Samsung’s and LG’s writs of mandamus, which sought to order the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to transfer the underlying actions to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The CAFC explained that the district court erred in failing to consider pre-litigation tactics by Ikorongo Technology LLC (Ikorongo Tech) and Ikorongo Texas LLC aimed at purposely manipulating venue in the case.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled on March 8 that Western District of Texas Judge Alan Albright’s failure to rule on a motion to transfer by Tracfone Wireless, Inc. was “strikingly similar to circumstances from the same district court last month in SK hynix,” which the court ruled amounted to “egregious delay.” Unlike SK hynix, Inc., F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2021), where the CAFC stopped short of granting a writ of mandamus, here, the petitioner’s writ of mandamus was granted and a stay of proceedings regarding all substantive issues was ordered until a decision is rendered on the motion to transfer.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled on February 1 that Western District of Texas Judge Alan Albright’s handling of a motion to transfer by SK hynix “amounted to egregious delay and blatant disregard for precedent” and ordered the district court to stay all proceedings until it has issued a ruling on the transfer motion “capable of providing meaningful appellate review of the reasons for its decision.”

On November 9, the Federal Circuit granted Apple’s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Western District of Texas to transfer Uniloc’s patent infringement suit against Apple to the Northern District of California. Judge Moore dissented, asserting that the majority applied an incorrect standard of review.

On November 3, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) issued an order in In re: Ivantis, Inc. denying a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Ivantis. The petition asked the CAFC to vacate an order of United States District Court for the Central District of California “granting an adverse-inference instruction and to bar the district court from issuing any adverse-inference instruction or alternatively to require the district court to defer consideration of any adverse-inference instruction until the end of trial.”

The Court believed the time was now appropriate to address this issue through a writ of mandamus noting that several similar cases had now been heard in various district courts with conflicting results. The Court identified two issues that should be addressed: (1) whether a server rack, a shelf, or analogous space can be a “place of business,” and (2) whether a “regular and established place of business” requires the regular presence of an employee or agent of the defendant conducting business. Finding that a defendant must have regular, physical presence of an employee or other agent of the defendant conducting the defendant’s business at the alleged “place of business,” the Court concluded that the Eastern District of Texas was not a proper venue for this case because Google does not have an employee or agent regularly conducting its business within the District.

Of the many lingering issues left in TC Heartland’s wake for domestic corporations, a Federal Circuit panel resolved several of them recently. In In re ZTE (USA), No. 2018-113, the court addressed two of the most common issues dogging appeals over the application of § 1400(b): whose law governs burden, and where does that burden lie. In In re Bigcommerce, No. 2018-120, the court addressed the territorial bounds mapped by the phrase “judicial district” in § 1400(b). Judge Linn authored both. 

In patent infringement suits brought against a corporate defendant in a state with multiple judicial districts, venue is only proper in the single district where the defendant maintains a principal place of business. If the principal place of business is not in the state of incorporation, venue is proper in the single judicial district where the office registered in its corporate filings is located.

After the case was filed in the Eastern District of Texas, ZTE filed a motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 and § 1400(b). The district court ruled that the Eastern District of Texas was a proper venue. Relying on Fifth Circuit law, the district court denied ZTE’s motion to dismiss, finding that ZTE “failed to meet its burden to show that it does not have a regular and established place of business in the District.” ZTE filed a petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant.

The Federal Circuit denied HTC Corp.’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking dismissal for improper venue… The patent venue statute does not apply to foreign corporations sued for patent infringement. These foreign defendants may be sued in any judicial district where they are subject to personal jurisdiction.

Waymo, a Google spin-off, sued Uber and Ottomotto for patent infringement and violations of federal and state trade secret laws. Waymo alleged that its former employee, Mr. Levandowski, improperly downloaded documents on Waymo’s driverless vehicle technology prior to leaving the company and founding Ottomotto, which was subsequently acquired by Uber… During discovery, the Magistrate Judge granted Waymo’s Motion to Compel production of the Stroz Report. Waymo subpoenaed Stroz to produce the report and accompanying communications, documents, and devices. After a Motion to Quash was denied, Levandowski, Ottomotto, and Uber filed Motions for Relief from the Magistrate’s orders. The District Court denied the Motions. Acting alone, Mr. Levandowski appealed the district court’s denial of relief. Because the orders were not appealable final judgments, Mr. Levandowski presented his appeal as a writ of mandamus. The Court denied the writ, dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and ordered production of the Report.

After briefly parsing the statutory language of §1400(b) critical to the decision the Federal Circuit concluded that Judge Gilstrap’s four-factor test was not compliant with the statutory language. Judge Lourie simply concluded: “The district court’s four-factor test is not sufficiently tethered to this statutory language and thus it fails to inform each of the necessary requirements of the statute.”… “The fact that Cray allowed its employees to work from the Eastern District of Texas is insufficient,” wrote Judge Lourie as he shifted to the specifics of the case before the Court.