

Nos. 2018-1167; -1168; -1169

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**United States Court of Appeals  
For the Federal Circuit**

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CELGENE CORPORATION,

*Appellant,*

v.

LAURA A. PETER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED  
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,

*Intervenor.*

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**Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office,  
Patent Trial and Appeal Board in  
Nos. IPR2015-01096; IPR2015-01102; IPR2015-01103**

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**APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC**

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F. Dominic Cerrito  
Andrew S. Chalson  
Frank Calvosa  
QUINN EMANUEL  
URQUHART & SULLIVAN  
51 Madison Ave., 22<sup>nd</sup> Fl.  
New York, NY 10010  
(212) 849-7000

Anthony M. Insogna  
JONES DAY  
4655 Executive Drive  
San Diego, CA 92121  
(858) 314-1200

Gregory A. Castanias  
Jennifer L. Swize  
Jihong Lou  
JONES DAY  
51 Louisiana Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20001  
(202) 879-3939  
gcastanias@jonesday.com

*Counsel for Appellant*

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**CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST**

Counsel for Appellant Celgene Corporation certify the following:

1. The full name of every party represented by me is:

Celgene Corporation

2. The name of the real party in interest (not including any party identified in Question 3) represented by me is:

Celgene Corporation

3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10 percent of more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are:

None

4. The name of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are expected to appear in this Court (and who have not or will not enter an appearance in this case) are:

JONES DAY: J. Patrick Elsevier, Ph.D. (no longer with firm)

QUINN EMANUEL: Eric C. Stops

5. The title and number of any cases known to counsel to be pending in this or any other court or agency that may directly affect or be directly affected by this Court's decision in the pending appeals are:

*Celgene Corp. v. Peter*, No. 18-1171 (Fed. Cir.), is a companion case.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

	<b>Page</b>
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST .....	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....	iii
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL .....	1
INTRODUCTION .....	1
BACKGROUND .....	2
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF EN BANC REHEARING .....	3
I. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF <i>INTER PARTES</i> REVIEW TO EXISTING PATENTS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING.....	3
A. Patents Are Constitutionally Protected Property .....	3
B. Rights In Patents Cannot Be Narrowed Retroactively.....	4
C. Retroactive Application Of <i>Inter Partes</i> Review To Pre-AIA Patents Invades And Destroys Vested Property Rights .....	5
D. Retroactive Application Of <i>Inter Partes</i> Review To Pre-AIA Patents Upsets Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations.....	6
E. <i>Patlex And Joy Technologies</i> Do Not Inform This Case.....	14
II. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR ADDRESSING THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE .....	16
CONCLUSION .....	18
ADDENDUM	
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE	
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	

**TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

<b>CASES</b>	<b>Page</b>
<i>Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal</i> , 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) .....	9
<i>Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith &amp; Nephew, Inc.</i> , 935 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .....	16
<i>Celgene Corp. v. Peter</i> , 931 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019) .....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp.</i> , No. 2018-1311, 2019 WL 3545450 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 2019) .....	16
<i>College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.</i> , 527 U.S. 666 (1999) .....	6
<i>Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co.</i> , 210 U.S. 405 (1908) .....	6
<i>Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee</i> , 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) .....	9
<i>Dolan v. City of Tigard</i> , 512 U.S. 374 (1994) .....	6
<i>E. Enters. v. Apfel</i> , 524 U.S. 498 (1998) .....	1, 3, 17
<i>Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson &amp; Co.</i> , No. 2018-1232, 2019 WL 3851578 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019) .....	16
<i>Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.</i> , 535 U.S. 722 (2002) .....	5
<i>Graham v. Goodcell</i> , 282 U.S. 409 (1931) .....	15

*Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.*,  
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).....1, 4

*Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.*,  
569 U.S. 513 (2013).....17

*In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC*,  
793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .....7

*James v. Campbell*,  
104 U.S. 356 (1882).....1, 4

*Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck*,  
959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992) .....14, 15

*Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.*,  
416 U.S. 470 (1974).....13, 14

*Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa.*,  
139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).....3

*Lindh v. Murphy*,  
521 U.S. 320 (1997).....11

*Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*,  
544 U.S. 528 (2005).....15

*Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.*,  
458 U.S. 419 (1982).....6

*Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*,  
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).....1, 10

*McClurg v. Kingsland*,  
42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843) .....*passim*

*Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC*,  
138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).....1, 3, 4

*Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff*,  
758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985) .....14, 15

*Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York*,  
438 U.S. 104 (1978).....7

*Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States*,  
397 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .....11

*Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv.*,  
139 S. Ct. 1853 (2019).....8

*Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States*,  
275 U.S. 331 (1928).....4

*Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.*,  
467 U.S. 986 (1984).....17

*SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu*,  
138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).....14

*Soc’y for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of New Haven*,  
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823) .....5

*United States v. Stanchich*,  
550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977) .....11

*Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.*,  
428 U.S. 1 (1976).....15

**STATUTES**

35 U.S.C. § 6.....8

35 U.S.C. § 112.....13

35 U.S.C. § 261.....3, 4

35 U.S.C. § 305.....7

35 U.S.C. § 306.....7

35 U.S.C. § 311.....8

35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).....8

35 U.S.C. § 316(d).....8

American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113  
Stat. 1501 .....13

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284  
(2011).....*passim*

**OTHER AUTHORITIES**

U.S. Const. amend. V.....*passim*

H.R. Rep. No. 97-312 (1981).....2

H.R. Rep. No. 112-98 (2011).....8

Notice Regarding a New Pilot Program Concerning Motion To  
Amend Practice and Procedures in Trial Proceedings Under the  
America Invents Act Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,  
84 Fed. Reg. 9497 (Mar. 15, 2019).....9

Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, *Taking Patents*, 73 Wash. & Lee L.  
Rev. 719 (2016) .....7

Gregory Dolin, *Dubious Patent Reform*, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881 (2015).....9, 12

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, *Empirical Evidence on the  
Validity of Litigated Patents*, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185 (1998).....10

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Patent Trial and Appeal Board Update (Feb. 7, 2019), *available at*  
[https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/  
20190207\\_PPAC\\_PTAB\\_Update.pdf](https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20190207_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf).....8

## **STATEMENT OF COUNSEL**

Based on my professional judgment, I believe the panel decision is contrary to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and to related Supreme Court Takings Clause precedents, *e.g.*, *Horne v. Dep't of Agric.*, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); *E. Enters. v. Apfel*, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); *Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); *James v. Campbell*, 104 U.S. 356 (1882); and *McClurg v. Kingsland*, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).

Based on my professional judgment, I believe this appeal requires an answer to a precedent-setting question of exceptional importance: Whether retroactive application of *inter partes* review (“IPR”), to patent claims issued before the America Invents Act (“AIA”), constitutes an unconstitutional taking?

/s/ Gregory A. Castanias  
Gregory A. Castanias  
Counsel for Appellant

## **INTRODUCTION**

The panel held that “the retroactive application of IPR proceedings to pre-AIA patents is not an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.” *Celgene Corp. v. Peter*, 931 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019). This issue deserves en banc review. Not only is the panel holding contrary to the Fifth Amendment and Supreme Court precedents, but the issue is of national importance. The Supreme Court in *Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group*,



*LLC*, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018), explicitly left the issue open, and this Court is the only appeals court with both the authority—and congressional mandate—to consider the issue and establish the proper ruling en banc. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (observing that increased uniformity from a single court for patent appeals would “strengthen the United States patent system”).

### **BACKGROUND**

In four related IPRs, the Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC (“CFAD”), a third party without standing to sue in district court, challenged the patentability of all claims of Celgene’s two patents-at-issue: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,045,501 (“the ’501 patent”) and 6,315,720 (“the ’720 patent”). Celgene applied for the patents in 1998 and 2000, respectively—at least 15 years before CFAD filed its petitions and more than a decade before Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) held all but one claim unpatentable.

Celgene appealed, challenging, among other things, the retroactive application of *inter partes* review to its pre-AIA patents as an unconstitutional taking. CFAD declined to participate. The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) intervened.

In a single, precedential decision, the panel affirmed the Board’s unpatentability determinations for both patents and held that retroactive application

of IPRs to pre-AIA patents does not violate the Takings Clause. The panel rested its latter holding primarily on its view that “IPRs do not differ sufficiently from the PTO reconsideration avenues available when the patents here were issued to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.” *Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1360. Celgene hereby seeks rehearing (with identical petitions).

### **ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF EN BANC REHEARING**

#### **I. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF *INTER PARTES* REVIEW TO EXISTING PATENTS IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING**

##### **A. Patents Are Constitutionally Protected Property**

The Takings Clause states that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Clause provides a “safeguard against retrospective legislation concerning property rights.” *E. Enters.*, 524 U.S. at 532-34 (“Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law,” especially where it “deprive[s] citizens of legitimate expectations and upset[s] settled transactions.”). Where a “government takes private property without paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment.” *Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pa.*, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019).

Celgene’s patents are unquestionably private property. *See Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1358 (“[A] valid patent is private property for the purposes of the Takings Clause.”). “Subject to the provisions of [Title 35], patents shall have the attributes of personal property,” 35 U.S.C. § 261; *see Oil States*, 138 S. Ct. at 1375 (citing

§ 261), and *Horne* holds that personal property—patents included—are not “any less protected against physical appropriation than real property.” 135 S. Ct. at 2427; *see also Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States*, 275 U.S. 331, 345 (1928) (“[A]n attempt to take away” a private citizen’s claim for patent infringement would “raise a serious question as to the constitutionality ... under the Fifth Amendment.”). In fact, in *Horne*, the Supreme Court relied on its prior decision in *James*, 104 U.S. at 357-58, which held “we have no doubt” that a granted “letters-patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts, confers upon the patentee an exclusive property,” which “cannot be appropriated or used ... without just compensation.”

**B. Rights In Patents Cannot Be Narrowed Retroactively**

Section 261 “qualifies any property rights that a patent owner has in an issued patent, subjecting them to the express provisions of the Patent Act,” *Oil States*, 138 S. Ct. at 1375, but provisions added to the Patent Act after a patent becomes the personal property of its owner cannot, consistent with the Takings Clause, narrow or eliminate those property rights.

In *McClurg*, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 206, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s power to “legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary,” but only insofar as such legislation “do[es] not take away the rights of property in existing patents.” A legislative change, the *McClurg* Court said, “can have no effect to

impair the right of property then existing in a patentee, or his assignee, according to the well-established principles of this court in” *Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Town of New Haven*, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464, 493-94 (1823) (“[I]t has never been supposed, that rights of property already vested during [a statute’s] existence, were gone by such [a] repeal” because “[s]uch a construction would overturn the best established doctrines of law, and sap the very foundation on which property rests.”). *McClurg*, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 206. In recognition of this foundational principle, the Supreme Court has cautioned against “adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community,” which “risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors in their property.” *Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.*, 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002).

**C. Retroactive Application Of *Inter Partes* Review To Pre-AIA Patents Invades And Destroys Vested Property Rights**

Retroactive application of the AIA’s new IPR regime to previously issued patents impairs those patent owners’ vested property rights. At the time of their issuance, pre-AIA patents were subject only to limited reexaminations by the PTO, or to invalidity challenges in civil litigation brought by plaintiffs with an Article III stake in the dispute. If not vacated, the Board’s decisions, which addressed the patentability of Celgene’s patent claims pursuant to the after-enacted AIA, would permanently eliminate Celgene’s vested property rights in its patents, constituting an unconstitutional taking.

“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.” *College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.*, 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999). That “most essential stic[k] in the bundle of rights,” *Dolan v. City of Tigard*, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994), is “the very essence of the right conferred” by a patent, *Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co.*, 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908), so an IPR cancellation takes away the entirety of the property right. Accordingly, it makes no difference whether the IPR statute’s after-the-fact taking of Celgene’s property is envisioned as a “physical taking” or a “regulatory” one—the taking here was complete, permanent, and far more of an affront to settled expectations in property than was the “minor but permanent physical occupation” caused by the installation of cables and boxes on an apartment building, *Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.*, 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982), or the insistence on public easements in *Dolan*, 512 U.S. at 393, both of which ran afoul of the Takings Clause. The new AIA scheme improperly “take[s] away the rights of property in existing patents.” *See McClurg*, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 206.

**D. Retroactive Application Of *Inter Partes* Review To Pre-AIA Patents Upsets Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations**

The cancellation of a patent (or claim) is a complete removal of the owner’s personal property, and is appropriately regarded as a complete, “physical” taking. But, even viewed under the more generous rubric of regulatory takings, the AIA remains unconstitutional when applied to patents already issued pre-AIA. *See*

*Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York*, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (regulatory taking occurs where, *inter alia*, the regulation economically affected the plaintiff and interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations). Pre-AIA patent owners made reasonable investment-backed decisions based on the then-existing (administrative) patent-reconsideration and (court) invalidation schemes, including each system’s safeguards against overzealous invalidation.

In reexamination—the PTO reconsideration process that existed pre-AIA—patent owners have an unfettered right to amend claims, which serves the important purpose of preserving claims against *ex post* cancellation. *In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC*, 793 F.3d 1268, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting). This unlimited right to amend claims, for both *ex parte* and *inter partes* reexamination, continues a patent owner’s “*pas de deux* with the PTO” that began in initial examination, to clarify claim scope over the prior art. Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, *Taking Patents*, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 719, 785-86 (2016). Additionally, reexaminations permit disappointed patent owners to seek multiple layers of review—both administrative and judicial. 35 U.S.C. §§ 305, 306.

The AIA scheme, by contrast, created a vast administrative apparatus whose very purpose and effect has been to cancel wide swaths of already-issued patents. This new regime differs “fundamentally” from reexamination, as the Supreme

Court recently observed in *Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service*, 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1865 (2019). In fact, Congress intended *inter partes* review to supplant court litigation and replace administrative reexamination, but with lighter burdens for challengers and a structure specifically designed to cancel issued patents. The legislative history demonstrates that the AIA was passed with the express purpose of providing “quick and cost effective alternatives to *litigation*,” and “convert[ing] *inter partes* reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 46, 48 (2011) (emphasis added). And, unlike federal courts constrained by Article III standing requirements, any “person,” regardless of standing, may (as here) mount an IPR challenge. 35 U.S.C. § 311. To carry out Congress’s mandate, including the AIA’s tight deadlines for IPRs, the PTO has amassed a Board of 270 judges—almost 100 more than currently authorized to sit on all thirteen federal courts of appeals. *See* 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316(a)(11); [https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20190207\\_PPAC\\_PTAB\\_Update.pdf](https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20190207_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf), at p. 4.

The differences between the AIA and the regimes that posed risks to patents prior to that act go even further. Unlike in reexamination, a patent owner’s right to amend claims in the adjudicatory context of *inter partes* review is significantly restricted; it must file a motion to amend, proposing substitute claims, and its statutory right to seek amendment is limited to “1 motion.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)

(exceptions only for settlement purposes, or if PTO regulations permit).

Additionally, the PTO has broad latitude in determining the standard for claim construction in IPRs, and for several years it applied the broadest reasonable interpretation (“BRI”) standard used in initial examination. *See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee*, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016). The BRI standard alone subjects patent claims to a higher likelihood of prior-art-based invalidation. Although the Board no longer applies that standard or places on patent owners the burden to prove patentability of amended claims, *see Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal*, 872 F.3d 1290, 1301, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc), the AIA’s statutory constraints on amending claims are unlike any prior schemes. New PTO rules that permit some back-and-forth, *see* 84 Fed. Reg. 9497 (Mar. 15, 2019), cannot achieve the meaningful, extended amendment process in reexamination, given the AIA’s mandate that each IPR conclude within a year. Moreover, numerous patents, like Celgene’s, were taken under prior PTO rules.

The advent of IPRs has resulted in a drastically higher invalidation rate than before, which at minimum devalues, if it does not entirely eliminate, existing property rights. With the unfettered right to amend claims in reexamination, patent owners had a high likelihood to emerge with their property rights preserved, at least in some form. *See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform*, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881, 924 (2015) (cancellation of all claims in only 12% of instituted



reexaminations). By contrast, since taking effect in 2012, IPRs have a significantly higher rate of cancellation. *See id.* at 926-28 (cancellation of all claims, including claims having survived previous reexamination, in 74% of instituted IPRs).

The alternative scheme available at the time—invalidity challenges in district court—has its own protections against overzealous invalidation of patents, which are absent in IPRs. Importantly, the presumption of validity in district-court litigation (and the attendant clear-and-convincing burden of proof) lends value to patent owners' property interests. Statistics show a prior-art-invalidation rate in litigation (37.8%) at half the rate of IPRs. *See* John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, *Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents*, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 209 (1998). Plus, unlike in IPRs, Article III significantly narrows the class of persons who can mount an invalidity challenge, and most such challenges only come in response to litigation brought or threatened by the property owner.

These fundamental differences between IPRs and prior statutory schemes upset reasonable investment-backed expectations of pre-AIA patent owners in their property rights. Here, the Board's decisions deprive Celgene of “*all* economically beneficial uses” of its invalidated claims. *Lucas*, 505 U.S. at 1019. That is a quintessential taking.

The panel found the differences between IPRs and their reexamination predecessors “not sufficiently substantive” to constitute a taking. *Celgene*, 931

F.3d at 1360. But the panel failed to recognize that so-called “procedural” changes can “go[] beyond ‘mere’ procedure to affect substantive entitlement to relief.” *Lindh v. Murphy*, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); *see also Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States*, 397 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (imposition of new evidentiary presumption “changes the law in a significant way”). That is the case with retroactive application of the AIA and its dramatically increased cancellation rate. As Judge Friendly observed, “[j]udges are not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.” *United States v. Stanchich*, 550 F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1977).

The thin evidence on which the Board relied here in finding Celgene’s patent claims unpatentable exemplifies the substantive change effected by the AIA. Without holding the petitioner to a clear-and-convincing burden of proof as exists in district-court litigation, and without the safeguards that apply in reexamination, the Board found Celgene’s claims obvious under the lower, preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.

For example, the Board held the ’720 patent claims obvious even though it failed to consider whether the prior art teaches all of their limitations, such as the claimed “prescription approval code,” which the Board construed as requiring “an affirmative risk assessment” that “is generated only upon a determination that the risk of a side effect occurring is acceptable,” *i.e.*, a prospective risk assessment.

Appx00015. Although the panel found no error in the Board’s omission of the word “prospective” in its analysis because the claims do not use that term, *see Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1355, the panel missed the point. Whether the word “prospective” was used or not, the Board failed to identify any prior-art reference disclosing the critical requirement that the “prescription approval code” be “generated only upon a determination that the risk of a side effect occurring is acceptable,” and none does. That minimal analysis regarding a key point is inextricably tied with the set of standards and procedures unique to the AIA scheme. *See* 18-1167 Opening Br. 38-43; 18-1167 Reply Br. 6-11. Likewise for the ’501 patent, where, for example, the panel found no error in the Board’s reliance on the slender reed of expert opinion invoking a non-asserted reference (Mann), *see Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1351-52, even though that opinion contradicted a principal asserted reference (Powell) as read unanimously by the parties and experts—that expert included. *See* 18-1171 Opening Br. 25-31; 18-1171 Reply Br. 4-5. And as statistics show, this diminishment of patent value effected by the AIA reaches broadly across all technologies. *See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform*, 56 B.C. L. Rev. at 926-29.

Finally, pre-AIA patent owners also have reasonable investment-backed expectations due to Congress’s handling of prior modifications to the reexamination statute. When Congress added *inter partes* reexamination in 1999,

it explicitly applied that scheme prospectively only. *See* American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4608(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-572. Pre-AIA patent owners, and particularly those who applied for their patents after enactment of the *inter partes* reexamination scheme, such as Celgene with respect to its '720 patent, reasonably expected that Congress would likewise apply any additional PTO-reconsideration schemes prospectively only. But it did not. *See* AIA § 6(c)(2)(A), 125 Stat. at 304 (IPR provisions “shall apply to any patent issued before, on, or after [AIA] effective date”). The expectation is especially apt here, where the IPR scheme is radically different from what existed at the time—and where long-settled Supreme Court case law, *e.g.*, *McClurg*, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 206, casts serious doubts on *ex post* diminishment of patent rights.

Patent holders invest substantial sums of money to develop patentable inventions in return for limited exclusionary rights. When inventors enter into this “patent bargain,” they must weigh the burden of disclosing their inventions against the potential benefit of receiving the property right. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 112. Disclosure, of course, eliminates the inventor’s option of protecting the invention as a trade secret. *See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.*, 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). By so fundamentally changing the rules of the game after-the-fact—and creating and funding a muscular patent-invalidation apparatus in the form of the PTAB—Congress unilaterally, and impermissibly, added a new term to the patent

bargain after the deal was done. If such *post hoc* governmental self-dealing is given imprimatur under the Takings Clause, the patent system will lose the reliability necessary for investors and inventors to “stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances” that “are of such importance to the public weal.” *Kewanee Oil*, 416 U.S. at 481. Congress’s change of course in retroactively applying IPRs unconstitutionally interferes with pre-AIA patent owners’ reasonable investment-backed expectations.

**E. *Patlex* And *Joy Technologies* Do Not Inform This Case**

The panel found support in this Court’s prior rejection of takings arguments with respect to *ex parte* reexamination. See *Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1358 n.13 (citing *Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff*, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), and *Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck*, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). For several reasons, *Patlex* (like *Joy*, which relied on *Patlex* without separately analyzing the takings issue) does not inform the constitutional question here.

First, *Patlex* concerned *ex parte* reexamination, which, as explained, is fundamentally different from IPR. *Ex parte* reexamination has many of the same features as initial examination, whereas IPR has “many of the usual trappings of litigation,” *SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu*, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353-54 (2018), but without the safeguards attendant to district-court litigation. Thus, *Patlex* plainly did not address the constitutional question presented here.

*Second, Patlex* rests on since-repudiated grounds. *Patlex* examined whether “[t]he public interest [is] served” by a statute’s retrospective application. 758 F.2d at 601. The Supreme Court has since explained that, although an inquiry into whether retroactive application “achiev[es] some legitimate public purpose” “has some logic in the context of a *due process* challenge,” “such a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been ‘*taken*’ for purposes of Fifth Amendment.” *Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.*, 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (emphases added). Indeed, *Patlex* relied heavily on *Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.*, 428 U.S. 1 (1976), but as *Patlex* itself noted, *Usery* involved a “due process,” not a takings, challenge. *See Patlex*, 758 F.2d at 601-02. Likewise for *Patlex*’s emphasis on the “relatively favored treatment” of “[c]urative statutes” applied retroactively. *Id.* at 603 (citing *Graham v. Goodcell*, 282 U.S. 409, 429 (1931)). *Graham*, too, involved a due process, not a takings, challenge.

*Third*, contrary to the panel’s supposition, the fact that “there were no PTO reexamination procedures” before Congress enacted the reexamination statute does not make the takings challenges in *Patlex* and *Joy* “stronger” than *Celgene*’s challenge here. *Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1358 n.13. Again, that improperly ignores the differences between IPRs and reexaminations. In any event, in *Patlex* and *Joy*, the Court did not consider the takings issues en banc. This case presents the first opportunity for the Court acting en banc to revisit those prior holdings.

## II. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR ADDRESSING THIS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

Celgene's constitutional challenge is a pure question of law—whether the AIA's retroactive application of *inter partes* review to pre-AIA patents is an unconstitutional taking. Because pre-AIA patents may be effective until at least 2031, if not thereafter, the impact of the panel decision is profound. Unless and until en banc or Supreme Court review, the panel decision will be the final word. In fact, other panels have already dismissed similar constitutional challenges without discussion, citing this panel's decision.\*

Also, the panel decision's inevitable effects warrant prompt reconsideration. The decision introduces great uncertainty for companies that would ordinarily rely on the protections of an issued patent in deciding to invest significant time and money to develop the patented invention and, subsequently, commercial embodiments, including life-saving products of crucial benefit to the public. Without sufficient *ex ante* certainty about the ways in which patents may later be challenged, companies may alter or redirect their research, development, and commercialization efforts to the public's detriment. Worse, the panel decision

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\* See, e.g., *Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.*, 935 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019); *Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.*, No. 2018-1232, 2019 WL 3851578, at \*7 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2019); *Collabo Innovations, Inc. v. Sony Corp.*, No. 2018-1311, 2019 WL 3545450, at \*4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 2019).

provides both invitation and roadmap for future legislation to diminish, *ex post*, the enforcement rights of entire classes of patents or patent owners.

Nor is the PTO's waiver argument to the panel any impediment to en banc review. *See Celgene*, 931 F.3d at 1356-57. As the panel recognized, the Board could not have corrected the constitutional error, and this broadly relevant, "pure[]" legal issue was squarely presented here, warranting resolution. *Id.* Regardless, for a precedential decision on the issue, thereby governing all future cases, the PTO's argument is no obstacle.

Finally, the fact that the takings issue arises as a defense rather than as a claim for compensation makes no difference. The PTO certainly does not dispute this Court's jurisdiction to decide the takings challenge. And, a Fifth Amendment takings claim may be raised as a defense where, as here, the taking is "final" and there is no "adequate process for obtaining compensation." *Horne v. Dep't of Agric.*, 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013); *accord E. Enters.*, 524 U.S. at 519-22 (addressing takings challenge in appeal from district court, rather than Court of Federal Claims); *Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.*, 467 U.S. 986, 998-1000, 1013-14 (1984) (same).

This is an ideal case for the full Court to address the important constitutional question presented.



**CONCLUSION**

The Court should grant rehearing.

September 27, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gregory A. Castanias

GREGORY A. CASTANIAS

JENNIFER L. SWIZE

JIHONG LOU

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 879-3939

gcastanias@jonesday.com

jswize@jonesday.com

jlou@jonesday.com

ANTHONY M. INSOGNA

JONES DAY

4655 Executive Drive

San Diego, CA 92121

(858) 314-1200

aminsogna@jonesday.com

F. DOMINIC CERRITO

ANDREW S. CHALSON

FRANK CALVOSA

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &

SULLIVAN LLP

51 Madison Avenue, 22<sup>nd</sup> Floor

New York, NY 10010

(212) 849-7000

nickcerrito@quinnemanuel.com

andrewchalson@quinnemanuel.com

frankcalvosa@quinnemanuel.com

*Counsel for Appellant*

*Celgene Corporation*

**ADDENDUM**

931 F.3d 1342  
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

CELGENE CORPORATION, Appellant  
v.  
Laura A. PETER, Deputy Under Secretary  
of Commerce for Intellectual Property  
and Deputy Director of the United States  
Patent and Trademark Office, Intervenor  
Celgene Corporation, Appellant  
v.  
Laura A. Peter, Deputy Under Secretary  
of Commerce for Intellectual Property  
and Deputy Director of the United States  
Patent and Trademark Office, Intervenor

2018-1167, 2018-1168, 2018-1169  
|  
2018-1171  
|  
Decided: July 30, 2019

**Synopsis**

**Background:** In proceeding for inter partes review, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) determined that claims in patents generally directed to methods for safely delivering teratogenic or other potentially hazardous drugs while avoiding exposure to a fetus were invalid as obvious. After its request for rehearing was denied, 2017 WL 4014986, patentee appealed.

**Holdings:** The Court of Appeals, Prost, Chief Judge, held that:

“computer readable storage medium” claim was invalid for obviousness;

substantial evidence supported PTAB's finding that it would have been obvious in light of prior art to counsel male patients about risks of fetal exposure to drug;

substantial evidence supported PTAB's finding that patentee's evidence of long-felt but unmet need, industry praise, and unexpected results did not outweigh showing of obviousness;

substantial evidence supported PTAB's finding that there was a motivation to improve existing distribution methods of potentially hazardous drugs; and

retroactive application of inter partes review process to invalidate patents filed before Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was not unconstitutional taking.

Affirmed.

\*1345 Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2015-01096, IPR2015-01102, IPR2015-01103.

**Attorneys and Law Firms**

Gregory A. Castanias, Jones Day, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by Jihong Lou, Jennifer Loraine Swize; Gasper LaRosa, New York, NY; Anthony Insogna, San Diego, CA; Frank Charles Calvosa, F. Dominic Cerrito, Andrew Chalson, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY.

Amy J. Nelson, Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for intervenor. Also represented by Meredith Hope Schoenfeld, Thomas W. Krause. Also argued by Katherine Twomey Allen, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Also represented by Mark R. Freeman, Scott R. Mcintosh, Joseph H. Hunt.

Before Prost, Chief Judge, Bryson and Reyna, Circuit Judges.

**Opinion**

Prost, Chief Judge.

\*1346 The Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI LLC (“CFAD”) filed a petition for *inter partes* review (“IPR”) challenging the validity of all of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,045,501 (“the ’501 patent”) and three petitions for IPR challenging the validity of all of the claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,315,720 (“the ’720 patent”). The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) determined that all of the claims of the ’501 patent and claims 1–9 and 11–32 of the ’720 patent were obvious. Celgene Corporation (“Celgene”) appeals the Board’s decisions.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the Board’s decisions finding the appealed claims obvious. We also hold

that the retroactive application of IPR proceedings to pre-AIA patents is not an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.

I

A

A teratogen is an agent known to disturb the development of an embryo or fetus. Teratogenic drugs can cause birth defects or other abnormalities following fetal exposure during pregnancy. One example of a teratogenic drug is thalidomide. Thalidomide, first synthesized in 1957, was originally marketed for use as a sedative in many countries, not including the United States. *See* '501 patent col. 1 ll. 19–22. Following reports of serious birth defects, thalidomide was withdrawn from all markets by 1962. *Id.* at col. 1 ll. 22–24. Despite these teratogenic effects, thalidomide has proven to be effective in treating other conditions. *See id.* at col. 1 ll. 24–35. The '501 patent and the '720 patent are generally directed to methods for safely distributing teratogenic or other potentially hazardous drugs while avoiding exposure to a fetus to avoid adverse side effects of the drug.

B

In order to obtain FDA approval to sell and distribute thalidomide, Celgene developed a system to safely distribute thalidomide to patients, which it called the System for Thalidomide Education and Prescription Safety (“Original S.T.E.P.S.”). Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 8–9. According to Celgene, the '501 patent is directed to its Original S.T.E.P.S. program. *See id.* at 10.

Celgene’s '501 patent relates to “methods for delivering a drug to a patient while preventing the exposure of a foetus or other contraindicated individual to the drug.” '501 patent at Abstract. Claim 1 is representative and states:

1. A method for delivering a teratogenic drug to patients in need of the drug while avoiding the delivery of said drug to a foetus comprising:
  - a. registering in a computer readable storage medium prescribers who are qualified to prescribe said drug;

- b. registering in said medium pharmacies to fill prescriptions for said drug;
- c. registering said patients in said medium, including information concerning the ability of female patients to become pregnant and the ability of male patients to impregnate females;
- d. retrieving from said medium information identifying a subpopulation of said female patients who are capable of becoming pregnant and male patients who are capable of impregnating females;
- \*1347 e. providing to the subpopulation, counseling information concerning the risks attendant to fetal exposure to said drug;
- f. determining whether patients comprising said subpopulation are pregnant; and
- g. in response to a determination of non-pregnancy for said patients, authorizing said registered pharmacies to fill prescriptions from said registered prescribers for said non-pregnant registered patients.

*Id.* at claim 1. Claim 2 recites “[t]he method of claim 1 wherein said drug is thalidomide.” The remaining claims depend from claim 1 and are not limited to thalidomide.

CFAD filed a petition for IPR challenging all ten claims of the '501 patent. The Board instituted review of claims 1–10 on a single ground—obviousness based on Powell,<sup>1</sup> Mitchell,<sup>2</sup> and Dishman.<sup>3</sup> *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01092, Paper 20 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015).

- 1 R.J. Powell & J.M.M. Gardner-Medwin, *Guideline for the Clinical Use and Dispensing of Thalidomide*, 70 *Postgrad Med. J.* 901–904 (1994) (Appeal No. 18-1171, J.A. 324–25).
- 2 Allen A. Mitchell et al., *A Pregnancy-Prevention Program in Women of Childbearing Age Receiving Isotretinoin*, 333:2 *New Eng. J. Med.* 101–06 (July 13, 1995) (Appeal No. 18-1171, J.A. 328–33).
- 3 Benjamin R. Dishman et al., *Pharmacists’ Role in Clozapine Therapy at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center*, 51 *Am. J. Hosp. Pharm.* 899–901 (Apr. 1, 1994) (Appeal No. 18-1171, J.A. 334–36).

In its final written decision, the Board held that CFAD had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–10 of the ’501 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the combination of Powell, Mitchell, and Dishman. *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01092, Paper 73, at 33 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2016) (“’501 Final Written Decision”). The Board denied Celgene’s request for rehearing.

C

In the interim, Celgene “overhaul[ed]” its Original S.T.E.P.S. program to create what it called an “Enhanced S.T.E.P.S.” program. Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 8–9. According to Celgene, the ’720 patent is directed to its Enhanced S.T.E.P.S. program. *See id.* at 10.

Celgene’s ’720 patent relates to “[i]mproved methods for delivering to a patient in need of the drug, while avoiding the occurrence of an adverse side effect known or suspected of being caused by the drug.” ’720 patent at Abstract. Claim 1, written in Jepson format, states:

1. In a method for delivering a drug to a patient in need of the drug, while avoiding the occurrence of an adverse side effect known or suspected of being caused by said drug, wherein said method is of the type in which prescriptions for said drug are filled only after a computer readable storage medium has been consulted to assure that the prescriber is registered in said medium and qualified to prescribe said drug, that the pharmacy is registered in said medium and qualified to fill the prescription for said drug, and the patient is registered in said medium and approved to receive said drug, the improvement comprising:

- a. defining a plurality of patient risk groups based upon a predefined set of risk parameters for said drug;
- b. defining a set of information to be obtained from said patient, which information is probative of the risk that said adverse side effect is likely to \*1348 occur if said drug is taken by said patient;
- c. in response to said information set, assigning said patient to at least one of said risk groups and entering said risk group assignment in said medium;

- d. based upon said information and said risk group assignment, determining whether the risk that said adverse side effect is likely to occur is acceptable; and
- e. upon a determination that said risk is acceptable, generating a prescription approval code to be retrieved by said pharmacy before said prescription is filled.

CFAD filed three petitions for IPR, each challenging all 32 claims of the ’720 patent. The Board instituted review of claims 1–32 in all three cases. In the first IPR, the Board instituted review based on obviousness over the Thalomid Package Insert,<sup>4</sup> Cunningham,<sup>5</sup> Zeldis,<sup>6</sup> and other prior art. *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01096, Paper 21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015). In the second IPR, the Board instituted review based on obviousness over Powell and Dishman, in view of Cunningham, and further in view of Mann<sup>7</sup> and other prior art. *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01102, Paper 21 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015). In the third IPR, the Board instituted review based on obviousness over the same references as the second IPR but using Mitchell instead of Powell as the base reference. *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01103, Paper 22 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015).

4 *Thalomid™ (Thalidomide) Capsules Revised Package Insert* (July 15, 1998) (Appeal No. 18-1167, J.A. 411–32).

5 U.S. Patent No. 5,832,449 (Appeal No. 18-1167, J.A. 440–62).

6 Jerome B. Zeldis et al., *S.T.E.P.S.™: A Comprehensive Program for Controlling and Monitoring Access to Thalidomide*, *Clinical Therapeutics*® 21:2, 319–30 (1999) (Appeal No. 18-1167, J.A. 491–502).

7 Thaddeus Mann & Cecelia Lutwak-Mann, *Passage of Chemicals into Human and Animal Semen: Mechanisms and Significance*, 11:1 *CRC Critical Reviews in Toxicology* 1, 1–14 (1982) (Appeal No. 18-1167, J.A. 8237–52).

In each of its final written decisions, the Board held that CFAD had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–32 of the ’720 patent were unpatentable as obvious over the instituted ground. *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01096, Paper 73 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2016) (“’01096 Final Written Decision”);

*Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01102, Paper 75 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2016) (“-01102 Final Written Decision”); *Coalition for Affordable Drugs VI, LLC v. Celgene Corp.*, No. IPR2015-01103, Paper 76 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2016) (“-01103 Final Written Decision”). Following Celgene’s request for rehearing, the Board modified its final written decisions to uphold the patentability of claim 10 because CFAD failed to prove that claim obvious by a preponderance of the evidence.

D

Celgene timely appealed all four IPRs. We consolidated the appeals from the three IPRs on the ’720 patent (Appeal Nos. 18-1167, 18-1168, 18-1169) and designated the appeal from the IPR on the ’501 patent (Appeal No. 18-1171) as a companion case. CFAD did not participate in these appeals. The Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) intervened pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 143.

\*1349 We have jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

II

On appeal, Celgene argues that the Board erred in finding all claims of the ’501 patent and claims 1–9 and 11–32 of the ’720 patent obvious. Celgene also argues that the retroactive application of IPRs to patents filed before September 16, 2012, when the relevant provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act went into effect (“pre-AIA patents”), is an unconstitutional taking. We begin by addressing the merits of these appeals. Then, because we affirm the Board’s obviousness determinations, we turn to the constitutional challenge.

A

1

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual determinations. *Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC*, 805 F.3d 1064, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We review the Board’s ultimate obviousness determination de novo and underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. *Harmonic Inc. v. Avid*

*Tech., Inc.*, 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla” and means “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” *Biestek v. Berryhill*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019) (quoting *Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB*, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).

We review the Board’s determination of the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language de novo. *Straight Path IP Grp., Inc. v. Sipnet EU S.R.O.*, 806 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2015).<sup>8</sup>

8 We note that the PTO has since changed the claim construction standard used in IPR proceedings. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); *Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board*, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). The new standard applies only to petitions filed on or after November 13, 2018, and therefore does not impact these cases. In these IPRs, the claims were to be construed using the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification. *Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee*, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016).

2

We begin with the ’501 patent. Celgene seeks reversal, or at least vacatur and remand, of the Board’s determination that CFAD established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–10 would have been obvious over the combination of Powell, Mitchell, and Dishman. The Board relied on Powell’s teachings of the clinical use and dispensing of thalidomide; Mitchell’s description of a pregnancy-prevention program for women users of Accutane, another teratogenic drug; and Dishman’s disclosure of a registry for pharmacies, prescribers, and users of clozapine, an anti-psychotic drug with serious potential side effects. ’501 *Final Written Decision* at 13. The Board determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Powell, Mitchell, and Dishman “to address the problem of limiting thalidomide access to patients likely to suffer serious adverse side effects, including birth defects in a developing fetus.” *Id.* at 24.

On appeal, Celgene challenges three aspects of the Board’s obviousness determination: (1) its finding that the prior art



satisfies the “computer readable storage medium,” limitation, which rises and falls with a claim construction argument; (2) its \*1350 finding that it would have been obvious to counsel male patients about the risks of teratogenic drugs; and (3) its findings on secondary considerations. We address each in turn.

a

Before the Board, Celgene argued that the term “computer readable storage medium” in claim 1 requires a *centralized* computer readable storage medium, namely “a centralized database that includes all registration information regarding the claimed prescribers, pharmacies, and patients.” *’501 Final Written Decision* at 9–10. The Board considered Celgene’s proffered construction and rejected its argument that the computer readable storage medium of claim 1 must be centralized. *Id.* at 10–11. First, the Board noted that the term “centralized” does not appear in claim 1. *Id.* at 10. In addition, the Board found that the specification does not require that all registration information be centralized in one database. *Id.* (“ ‘The computer readable storage medium in which the pharmacies are registered may be the same as, or different from the computer readable storage medium in which the prescribers are registered.’ ” (quoting ’501 patent col. 4 ll. 54–57)). Finally, the Board considered and rejected Celgene’s prosecution history and extrinsic evidence arguments. *See id.* at 10–11.

On appeal, Celgene again argues that the claims require a *centralized* computer readable storage medium. Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 31–36. According to Celgene, the claims’ use of the term “said medium” referring back to “a computer readable storage medium” indicates that it must be a single, centralized computer readable storage medium. *Id.* at 32. But, as the PTO points out, the use of “a” or “an” in an open-ended “comprising” claim connotes “one or more.” Appeal No. 18-1171, Intervenor’s Br. 26–27; *Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc.*, 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008). And “[t]he subsequent use of definite articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular meaning.” *Baldwin*, 512 F.3d at 1342. Exceptions to the general rule that “a” or “an” means more than one arise only when “the language of the claims themselves, the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule.” *See id.* at 1342–43.

Neither the claims themselves, the specification, nor the prosecution history necessitate such a departure. *See ’501 Final Written Decision* at 10–11. The claims recite “a computer readable storage medium” and do not specify that it is centralized. The specification does not require that the computer readable storage medium be centralized. In fact, the specification envisions that there may be multiple, distinct computer readable storage media, i.e., separate media for prescribers, pharmacies, and patients. *See ’501 patent* at col. 4 ll. 54–57, col. 10 ll. 13–17.

Further, we are not persuaded by Celgene’s argument that the prosecution history disclaimed a non-centralized computer readable storage medium. *See Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 33–34.* We agree with the PTO that the better reading of the prosecution history is that Celgene distinguished the claimed invention from the prior art on the basis that the invention uses a computer readable storage medium while the prior art used the Internet. *See Appeal No. 18-1171, Intervenor’s Br. 31–33.*

Finally, because the intrinsic evidence does not require a *centralized* computer readable storage medium, the Board was correct to not allow the extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony, to “trump the \*1351 persuasive intrinsic evidence in this case.” *’501 Final Written Decision* at 10. Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the Board was therefore correct in determining that claim 1 was not limited to a *centralized* computer readable storage medium.

Based on the Board’s finding that the computer readable storage medium recited in claim 1 need not be centralized, the Board found that Dishman’s “computerized lockout system” satisfied the claim limitation. *Id.* at 18–20. Celgene concedes that Dishman teaches a decentralized storage medium and does not dispute that Dishman satisfies this limitation under the Board’s construction. *See Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 37.* Because Celgene’s challenge relies entirely on its proposed claim construction and we affirm the Board’s construction, Celgene’s challenge must fail.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Even under Celgene’s claim construction, the Board determined that its ultimate determination on obviousness would not change. *’501 Final Written Decision* at 11, 20. Specifically, the Board held, in the alternative, that using a centralized database would have been obvious. *See id.* at 20.

For these reasons, Celgene’s arguments on the “computer readable storage medium” limitation are unpersuasive and are not grounds for reversal or vacatur and remand.

b

Claim 1 of the ’501 patent requires providing “male patients who are capable of impregnating females” with “counseling information concerning the risks attendant to fetal exposure to said drug.” Celgene argues that counseling male patients about the risks of fetal exposure to the drug upon or after fertilization would not have been obvious. Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 25–31.

In finding this limitation obvious, the Board relied on CFAD’s expert Dr. Jeffrey Fudin’s opinion that at the time of the alleged invention, “the sperm of male patients could be damaged by teratogenic drugs and consequently result in birth defects, if the male was to impregnate a female.” *’501 Final Written Decision* at 15–16. For support, Dr. Fudin relied on the Mann study, which showed that thalidomide had negative effects on the sperm of male rabbits and the fetuses resulting from mating with female rabbits. *See id.* at 15–17.

The Board evaluated Dr. Fudin’s opinion and the supporting Mann study and credited his testimony that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have “understood the necessity of counseling males, capable of impregnating females, about the risks that attend fetal exposure to a teratogenic drug.” *Id.* at 16–17. The Board acknowledged that Powell stated that “[n]o effects on male sperm are recognized,” but found that statement alone insufficient to defeat Dr. Fudin’s testimony that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have recognized that sperm of male patients treated with teratogenic drugs could lead to birth defects in fetuses. *Id.* at 17.

On appeal, Celgene primarily disputes the Board’s reading of Powell, specifically the statement that “[n]o effects on male sperm are recognized.” *See* Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 26–29. The Board found that, when read in context, this statement in Powell refers to the *contraceptive* effects thalidomide has on male sperm, not the *teratogenic* effects thalidomide has on male sperm. *See ’501 Final Written Decision* at 17. Celgene argues that “[n]o reasonable fact finder could possibly read” this sentence in \*1352 Powell “as referring to the *contraceptive* effects of thalidomide.” Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 27. But, the Board’s

decision on this limitation relied on Dr. Fudin’s opinion, supported by Mann, as described above.

Celgene’s main challenge to Dr. Fudin’s opinion and his reliance on Mann was that the Mann study was conducted on male rabbits rather than human men. Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 30–31, Reply Br. 7–8. The Board considered and rejected this argument. *See ’501 Final Written Decision* at 17 (noting that Celgene previously admitted that studies related to rabbit sperm were relevant to evaluating the effects of thalidomide on human sperm). Substantial evidence supports the Board’s ultimate determination, based on Dr. Fudin’s opinion as supported by Mann, that it would have been obvious in light of the prior art to counsel male patients about the risks of fetal exposure to the drug.

c

Finally, Celgene challenges the Board’s determination that Celgene’s evidence of objective indicia of non-obviousness was unpersuasive. The Board considered and weighed Celgene’s evidence of long-felt but unmet need, industry praise, and unexpected results. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusions on each of these secondary considerations and its conclusion that they do not outweigh the showing of obviousness.

The Board found that Celgene failed to establish a long-felt but unsolved need because it did not show that the prior art methods of controlling the distribution of hazardous drugs—including Mitchell and Dishman—were insufficient to meet any need to control distribution of thalidomide. *’501 Final Written Decision* at 28. The Board acknowledged Celgene’s evidence of industry praise and gave it weight. *See id.* The Board also considered Celgene’s evidence of unexpected results but ultimately gave it “little weight” because the Board was not persuaded that the results obtained by combining the features of the prior art drug distribution programs to control distribution of thalidomide would have been truly unexpected. *See id.* at 28–29. The Board concluded that the evidence of secondary considerations did not outweigh the strong showing of obviousness. *See id.* at 29.

On appeal, Celgene challenges the Board’s findings on unexpected results and long-felt need. Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 38–41, Reply Br. 16–23. On unexpected results, Celgene faults the Board’s decision to give its evidence “little weight” and argues that it should have



been given “significant, if not dispositive weight.” Appeal No. 18-1171, Appellant’s Br. 39–40. However, substantial evidence supports the Board’s assessment and weighing of this evidence, and we decline to reweigh the evidence on appeal. *See In re NTP, Inc.*, 654 F.3d 1279, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court does not reweigh evidence on appeal, but rather determines whether substantial evidence supports the Board’s fact findings.”); *Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc.*, 903 F.3d 1286, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We do not reweigh the evidence. It is not our role to ask whether substantial evidence supports fact-findings not made by the Board, but instead whether such evidence supports the findings that were in fact made.”).

On long-felt need, Celgene identifies what it contends is an “inconsisten[cy]” between the Board’s determination in this IPR on the ’501 patent and the IPRs on the ’720 patent. Appeal No. 18-1171, Reply Br. 22–23. In this case, the Board found no long-felt but unmet need for a better system to distribute potentially hazardous drugs like thalidomide in part because existing systems were available and adequate. \*1353 ’501 *Final Written Decision* at 28. As explained below, in the IPRs on the ’720 patent, the Board found that there was a motivation to improve existing distribution systems for potentially hazardous drugs because of the severity of the possible adverse effects. *See, e.g., -01096 Final Written Decision* at 22–23.

Contrary to Celgene’s assertion, this tension is not irreconcilable. The fact that there is no long-felt, unmet need does not necessarily mean that there is no motivation to improve a system. *See Spectrum Pharm., Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.*, 802 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding district court’s finding that “despite the motivation ... there was not a long-felt but unmet need”). In fact, Celgene stated that it was “committed to making the S.T.E.P.S. program succeed and will make any modifications to the program that are necessary to ensure its effectiveness.” *See* Appeal No. 18-1167, J.A. 501. Especially in this context involving safety, we see no conflict between finding a motivation to improve the safety of existing systems even though the existing systems were mostly successful. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s assessment of Celgene’s evidence of long-felt, unresolved need.

Finally, we see no error in the Board’s ultimate determination of obviousness. Before concluding that the claims would have been obvious, the Board weighed the “strong showing of obviousness” against the “appropriate weight” given to

evidence of industry praise and the “little weight” given to evidence of unexpected results. ’501 *Final Written Decision* at 28–29.

We therefore affirm the Board’s holding that claims 1–10 of the ’501 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art.

3

Turning to the ’720 patent, Celgene seeks reversal, or at least vacatur and remand, of the Board’s determinations that CFAD established by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–9 and 11–32 would have been obvious over the prior art. The Board’s analysis relevant to this appeal was nearly identical across all three proceedings. *See -01096 Final Written Decision* at 15–26; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 16–27; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 16–27; *see also* Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 27, Intervenor’s Br. 26.

On motivation, the Board determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to improve the existing distribution methods of potentially hazardous drugs because “where significant safety risks exist with a drug, one would continuously search for safer ways to control the distribution of the drug.” *-01096 Final Written Decision* at 22–23; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 24–25; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 24–25.

The Board construed the claim term “prescription approval code” and adopted Celgene’s proposed construction: “[A] code representing that an affirmative risk assessment has been made based upon risk-group assignment and the information collected from the patient, and that is generated only upon a determination that the risk of a side effect occurring is acceptable.” *-01096 Final Written Decision* at 12–13; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 13; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 13.

The Board then considered whether the prior art taught the following disputed limitation: “upon a determination that said risk is acceptable, generating a prescription approval code to be retrieved by said pharmacy before said prescription is filled.” The Board determined that it \*1354 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art because they would have appreciated that Cunningham’s approval code, used to track and manage trial pharmaceutical products, could likewise be used by prescribers and pharmacies to track and

manage prescription pharmaceutical products. *-01096 Final Written Decision* at 24; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 26; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 26. The Board concluded that:

We further hold that the claimed improvement recited in the challenged claims represents a combination of known prior art elements (identifying patient risk groups, collecting patient information relating to the risk, determining whether the risk is acceptable, and controlling dispensation of the drug using both a prescription and an approval code) for their known purpose (control distribution of drug) to achieve a predictable result (avoid giving patients drugs that have an unacceptable risk of side effects).

*-01096 Final Written Decision* at 24–25; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 26; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 26.

On appeal, Celgene challenges two aspects of the Board’s obviousness determination: (1) its finding that there was a motivation to improve the existing distribution methods of potentially hazardous drugs; and (2) its finding that a person of skill in the art would have been motivated to develop the claimed invention. We address each below.

a

Celgene first argues that there was no motivation to improve the existing method for avoiding birth defects from exposure to thalidomide (the Original S.T.E.P.S. program) because it was working so well that there had been no reports of birth defects or even potential fetal exposure to thalidomide using that system. Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 32–33, 35–37. Celgene contends that because there were no problems with the Original S.T.E.P.S. program, a person skilled in the art would not have been motivated to improve it. *See id.* Celgene essentially argues that there was no motivation because, “[i]f it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” *Id.* at 33.

The Board considered and rejected this argument, finding that there was a motivation because there are serious concerns with distributing a drug, like thalidomide, that is known to cause severe adverse side effects. *-01096 Final Written Decision* at 22–23; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 24–25; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 24–25 (“[W]here significant safety risks exist with a drug, one would continuously search for safer ways to control the distribution of the drug. Put simply, where significant safety concerns exist[ ], one of ordinary skill in the art would not wait until an accident occurred to seek out improvements.”).

The Board’s motivation determination is supported by substantial evidence. For example, in *Zeldis*, Celgene professed its commitment to making improvements to the S.T.E.P.S. program. Appeal No. 18-1167, J.A. 501 (“Celgene is committed to making the S.T.E.P.S. program succeed and will make any modifications to the program that are necessary to ensure its effectiveness.”).

Finally, Celgene challenges the Board’s motivation as too “generic.” Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 35–37. We disagree. The desire to decrease the risks of administering a drug with adverse side effects, like thalidomide, is a specific motivation to improve the prior art. *See, e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc.*, 632 F.3d 1358, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding obviousness determination and motivation finding based on the “need in the prior art \*1355 for safer utility lighters”); *Hologic, Inc. v. Minerva Surgical, Inc.*, 764 F. App’x 873, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The lack of any specific safety concerns does not preclude a motivation to make a device safer.”). We disagree with Celgene’s assertion that approving of this motivation “leave[s] no room for patents on improvement.” Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 37. In a case like this, where safety is a concern and where the potential adverse side effects are so severe, the Board did not err in finding that the desire to improve a system that is working well qualifies as a valid motivation.

b

Celgene also argues that, even if there had been a general motivation to improve the prior art systems, “substantial evidence does not show that there was motivation to overhaul that program with the particular, *prospective*, doctor-interfering system claimed by the ’720 patent.” Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 38; *see also id.* at 38–43.

First, Celgene faults the Board for allegedly failing to explain “how the prior art renders obvious the claims’ required affirmative risk assessment.” *Id.* at 40. Contrary to Celgene’s assertions, the Board did not “ignore” its affirmative risk assessment argument. In fact, the Board incorporated the notion of affirmative risk assessment into its claim construction and considered it in its obviousness findings. *See -01096 Final Written Decision* at 12–15; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 13–16; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 13–16. The Board relied on each of the primary references—Thalomid Package Insert, Powell, and Mitchell—for the teaching of an affirmative risk assessment. *See -01096 Final Written Decision* at 17–18, 20 (Thalomid Package Insert); *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 17–18, 21–22 (Powell); *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 17–18, 21–22 (Mitchell). And the Board found that it would have been obvious to modify the methods for limiting distribution of drugs with adverse side effects to high risk groups, disclosed in Thalomid Package Insert, Powell, or Mitchell, to require issuance of an approval code prior to dispensing the drug as disclosed in Cunningham. *See -01096 Final Written Decision* at 23–25; *-01102 Final Written Decision* at 25–27; *-01103 Final Written Decision* at 25–27. Substantial evidence supports those findings.

Next, Celgene faults the Board for not including the word “prospective” in its final written decisions. Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 40. But the term “prospective” does not appear in claim 1 or in the Board’s construction of “prescription approval code.” Thus, it is neither erroneous nor particularly surprising that it does not appear in the Board’s final written decisions.

Finally, Celgene argues that none of the prior art references disclose a system to “override” a doctor’s prescription. *See, e.g.,* Appeal No. 18-1167, Appellant’s Br. 40–42, Reply Br. 3–4, 6–7. However, a physician “override” is not required by the language of claim 1 or by the Board’s construction of “prescription approval code.”

We therefore affirm the Board’s determination that claims 1–9 and 11–32 of the ’720 patent are unpatentable as obvious over the asserted prior art.

B

We now turn to the constitutional issue of whether the retroactive application of IPRs to pre-AIA patents is an unconstitutional taking.<sup>10</sup>

10 The parties’ arguments on the constitutional issue are almost identical in the two appeals. Therefore, in this section, we cite only to the briefs in Appeal No. 18-1167 unless otherwise noted.

\*1356 1

We must first decide whether to reach the constitutional challenge even though Celgene did not raise it before the Board and makes the argument for the first time on appeal.

“It is well-established that a party generally may not challenge an agency decision on a basis that was not presented to the agency.” *In re DBC*, 545 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008). But we have discretion to reach issues raised for the first time on appeal, and in *DBC* we recognized that there are exceptions that may justify considering constitutional arguments not raised below. *Id.* at 1379–80 (“Because we retain discretion to reach issues raised for the first time on appeal, we must consider whether this is one of those exceptional cases that warrants consideration of the [constitutional] issue despite its tardy presentation.”).

Departing from the general rule of waiver is appropriate only in limited circumstances. *See id.* at 1380 (stating that addressing an issue not raised below is “an exceptional measure” appropriate only in “rare cases”); *see also Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc.*, 527 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that “deviat[ing] from this general rule of waiver” and “hearing new arguments for the first time on appeal” is disfavored “absent limited circumstances”). One such circumstance that can justify departing from the general rule of waiver is an intervening change in the law. *See Golden Bridge*, 527 F.3d at 1323. We also consider whether the “interest of justice” guides us to consider the issue despite the fact that it was not raised below. *See id.*

The PTO concedes that we have discretion to deviate from our general rule of waiver and that doing so here to resolve the constitutional issue presented may be in the interest of justice. As the PTO recognized, “[g]iven the growing number of retroactivity challenges apparently prompted by the reference to retroactivity in *Oil States*, however, this Court may nevertheless conclude that the interests of justice

warrant addressing the retroactivity question quickly to avert further uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of inter partes review.” Intervenor’s Br. 37 (footnote omitted).

We have indeed seen a growing number of retroactivity challenges following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Oil States*, including several that are currently pending before this court. The Supreme Court left open this challenge with the following passage near the end of its decision in *Oil States*:

Moreover, we address only the precise constitutional challenges that *Oil States* raised here. *Oil States* does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when its patent issued. Nor has *Oil States* raised a due process challenge. Finally, our decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.

*Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379, 200 L.Ed.2d 671 (2018). While Celgene’s constitutional challenge does not rely on a change in the law articulated in *Oil States*, it raises an issue not directly resolved by *Oil States*. *Oil States* was decided on April 24, 2018, well \*1357 after the Board’s October 26, 2016 final written decisions in the IPRs involved in this appeal, which at least partially explains why Celgene did not raise the argument before the Board.

Even if Celgene had raised its constitutional challenge before the Board, it is unclear how the Board could have corrected the alleged constitutional defect as it could have in *DBC*. See *DBC*, 545 F.3d at 1379 (“If *DBC* had timely raised this issue before the Board, the Board could have evaluated and corrected the alleged constitutional infirmity by providing *DBC* with a panel of administrative patent judges appointed by the Secretary.”).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The Supreme Court has “stated that ‘adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies.’ ” *Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury*, 567 U.S. 1, 16, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1

(2012) (quoting *Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich*, 510 U.S. 200, 215, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994)). When asked at oral argument if the Board had authority to adjudicate a constitutional challenge to the AIA, the PTO responded that if the Board determined that the retroactive application of IPRs to pre-AIA patents was an unconstitutional taking, the Board could exercise its discretion to decline to institute the IPR. See Oral Argument at 36:52–37:57, *Celgene Corp. v. Peter* (No. 2018-1167), <http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings>. That decision, however, would be unreviewable but for the possibility of mandamus. See *Cuozzo*, 136 S. Ct. at 2142.

Moreover, the constitutional challenge presented here is purely a question of law, so addressing it would not require us “to make factual findings” for the first time on appeal. See *Golden Bridge*, 527 F.3d at 1323.

Finally, the briefing on the constitutional issue in this case is sufficiently thorough for our review. See Appellant’s Br. 44–52; Intervenor’s Br. 35–44; Reply Br. 20–28. This case stands in sharp contrast with *Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. IBG LLC*, 921 F.3d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2019), where we declined to consider a number of constitutional challenges to IPRs included in “a total of four sentences” in the appellant’s opening brief. *Id.* (“Such a conclusory assertion with no analysis is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.”). Here, a single constitutional issue received thorough briefing from the parties and was addressed extensively at oral argument. See Oral Argument at 5:06–21:50, 50:22–52:56 (Celgene), 36:27–48:47 (Director), *Celgene Corp. v. Peter* (No. 2018-1167), <http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings>.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> As to the suggestion that we wait until a case reaches us where the retroactivity challenge was raised below and decided by the Board, the first such case identified is *Agarwal v. TopGolf International, Inc.*, No. 18-2270. In *TopGolf*, the Board allowed additional briefing on the constitutional issues left open by *Oil States*. In a single sentence of analysis, the Board determined that the retroactive application of IPRs was not unconstitutional, reasoning that “the patent at issue here was subject to *ex parte* reexamination, and, therefore, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has always had the ability to look at the patentability of an issued United States Patent.” *TopGolf Int’l, Inc. v. Amit Agarwal*, No. IPR2017-00928, Paper 40, at 80 (P.T.A.B. June 13, 2018). On appeal, Mr. Agarwal’s constitutional challenge to the retroactive application of IPRs to pre-AIA patents is one page of his opening brief. Brief for



Appellant at 69–70, *Agarwal v. TopGolf Int’l, Inc.* (No. 18-2270). The reply brief is due on November 12, 2019, and the case will likely not be argued for at least several months thereafter.

We therefore conclude that this is one of those exceptional circumstances in which our discretion is appropriately exercised to hear Celgene’s constitutional challenge even though it was not raised below.

2

We now turn to the merits of Celgene’s constitutional challenge that the retroactive **\*1358** application of IPRs to pre-AIA patents is an unconstitutional taking.

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The PTO does not dispute that a valid patent is private property for the purposes of the Takings Clause. *See* Intervenor’s Br. 43 (“A patent holder has a property interest in a valid patent ....”); Oral Argument at 41:06–41:22, *Celgene Corp. v. Peter* (No. 2018-1167), <http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings>. (“We don’t dispute that a valid patent is property for purposes of the Takings Clause.”).

Celgene argues that the retroactive application of IPRs to their pre-AIA patents without just compensation is an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Appellant’s Br. 44–52. Specifically, Celgene advances a regulatory takings theory and argues that subjecting its pre-AIA patents to IPR, a procedure that did not exist at the time its patents issued, unfairly interferes with its reasonable investment-backed expectations without just compensation. *Id.* at 44–45, 49–51.

The PTO responds on two fronts. First, the PTO argues that when the Board finds claims unpatentable in an IPR, it does not effectuate a taking under the Fifth Amendment because the patent owner “never had a valid property right because the patent was erroneously issued in the first instance.” Intervenor’s Br. 38; *see also id.* at 38–41. Second, the PTO argues that Celgene’s takings claim fails “because patents have been subject to reconsideration and cancellation by the USPTO in administrative proceedings for nearly four decades, and Celgene’s own patent[s] were issued subject to this administrative revocation authority.” *Id.* at 42; *see also id.* at 42–44. The PTO does not

expressly engage Celgene’s reasonable investment-backed expectations argument. But the PTO does respond that “the AIA did not alter patent holders’ substantive rights.” *See id.* at 43. Rather, the PTO maintains that the AIA “merely revised the procedures by which [the] USPTO conducts these administrative proceedings” and that the procedural differences do not effect a Fifth Amendment taking. *See id.*

In determining whether the retroactive application of IPRs to pre-AIA patents is an unconstitutional taking, we consider the effect that doing so has on the patent right granted by the PTO, and specifically whether IPRs differ from the pre-AIA review mechanisms significantly enough, substantively or procedurally, to effectuate a taking. We conclude that they do not. On this basis, we reject Celgene’s challenge even apart from the rationales of our prior decisions—which we also think control the outcome here, but which Celgene asks us to reconsider—that rejected constitutional challenges to retroactive application of the pre-AIA *ex parte* reexamination mechanism.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> In *Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff*, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), we faced a challenge to the retroactive application of *ex parte* reexaminations and held that it did not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the jury trial guarantee of the Seventh Amendment, or Article III. *Id.* at 603, 605. Our retroactivity analysis in *Patlex* relied in part on the “curative” nature of reexaminations and that “[c]urative statutes have received relatively favored treatment from the courts even when applied retroactively.” *Id.* at 603.

We later considered a challenge to the retroactive application of *ex parte* reexaminations based on the Takings Clause in *Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Manbeck*, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992), *superseded by statute on other grounds*. Applying our reasoning in *Patlex*, we rejected the patent owner’s argument that *ex parte* reexamination and subsequent cancellation of some claims of its patent constituted a taking even though no PTO reexamination mechanisms existed when its patent issued. *See id.* at 228–29.

The patent owners in *Patlex* and *Joy Technologies* had a stronger argument than Celgene does here because, before the creation of *ex parte* reexaminations, there were no PTO reexamination procedures. In contrast, pre-AIA patent owners, including Celgene, have known for almost forty years that their patents were issued subject to substantively similar forms of PTO reexamination.

**\*1359** The validity of patents has always been subject to challenge in district court. And for the last forty years,

patents have also been subject to reconsideration and possible cancellation by the PTO. As explained below, IPRs do not differ significantly enough from preexisting PTO mechanisms for reevaluating the validity of issued patents to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking.

By the time Celgene filed the application that became the '501 patent (1998) and the patent was issued (2000), and by the time Celgene filed the application that became the '720 patent (2000) and the patent was issued (2001), *ex parte* reexamination had existed for roughly two decades. *Ex parte* reexamination, created by Congress in 1980 and still available today, allows “[a]ny person at any time” to “file a request for reexamination.” 35 U.S.C. § 302. The PTO determines whether the request raises “a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent.” *Id.* § 303(a). If it does, the reexamination is “conducted according to the procedures established for initial examination,” and the patent owner has the opportunity to amend claims. *Id.* § 305. The reexamination results in the confirmation of claims found to be patentable and the cancellation of claims found to be unpatentable. *Id.* § 307(a).

*Inter partes* reexamination, created by Congress in 1999, was also available when Celgene filed the '720 patent, although not when it filed the '501 patent. A third party could request *inter partes* reexamination, and the standard to initiate the reexamination was whether the request raised a “substantial new question of patentability.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–12 (1999) (amended). *Inter partes* reexamination “granted third parties greater opportunities to participate in the Patent Office’s reexamination proceedings,” and, following amendments in 2002, also allowed third parties to participate in any appeal of the PTO’s final reexamination decision. *See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee*, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016).

Celgene’s pre-AIA patents were therefore granted subject to existing judicial and administrative avenues for reconsidering their validity. Not only were they subject to challenge in district court, “[f]or several decades, the Patent Office has also possessed the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim that it had previously allowed.” *Id.*

IPRs are the most recent legislative modification to the PTO’s longstanding reconsideration procedures.<sup>14</sup> In 2011, as part of the AIA, Congress created IPRs, which replaced *inter partes* reexamination. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313 (2011)

(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012)). IPRs allow a third party to request that the PTO “reexamine the claims in an already-issued patent and to cancel any claim that the agency finds to be unpatentable in light of [the] prior art” specified in 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). *Cuozzo*, 136 S. Ct. at 2136.

14 Celgene’s suggestion that PTO reconsideration “is a creation of the 2011 AIA legislation” or only available “[s]ince the AIA” is incorrect. *See* Appellant’s Br. 46.

\*1360 In this case it suffices for us to decide that IPRs do not differ sufficiently from the PTO reconsideration avenues available when the patents here were issued to constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. Celgene identifies a number of differences between reexaminations and IPRs, including that IPRs are adjudicative and have discovery, briefing, and an oral hearing, Appellant’s Br. 47, but as explained below, these differences are not sufficiently substantive or significant to constitute a taking.

Unsurprisingly, Celgene does not grapple with the far more significant similarities between IPRs and their reexamination predecessors. In IPRs, patents are reviewed on the same substantive grounds—anticipation and obviousness, based on the same categories of prior art—as *ex parte* and *inter partes* reexaminations.<sup>15</sup> IPRs and reexaminations use the same preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. *See* 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“In an *inter partes* review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”); *In re Baxter Int’l, Inc.*, 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In PTO reexaminations ‘the standard of proof [is] a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” (quoting *In re Swanson*, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). And the same broadest reasonable interpretation standard for claim construction used in reexaminations also applied in these IPRs.<sup>16</sup> *See In re CSB-Sys. Int’l, Inc.*, 832 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“During reexamination proceedings of unexpired patents, however, the Board uses the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification’ standard, or BRI.” (quoting *In re NTP, Inc.*, 654 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).

15 It is undisputed that the Board’s grounds for determining unpatentability were available under the reexamination procedures in place at the time the '501 patent and '720 patent issued in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

16 As noted above, the PTO has since changed the claim construction standard used in IPR proceedings to align

with the standard used in district court proceedings, a change that is favorable to the patent owner. *See supra* note 8.

IPRs and reexaminations are also similar in that the Director has discretion to initiate the proceeding. In *ex parte* reexamination, the Director determines “whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request.” 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). In IPRs, the Director has discretion to institute IPR if there is “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” *Id.* § 314(a). In both proceedings, the Director’s discretionary determination is final and non-appealable. *See id.* §§ 303(c), 314(d).

Notably, IPRs serve essentially the same purpose as their reexamination predecessors. As the Supreme Court has said:

The [IPR] proceeding involves what used to be called a *reexamination* (and, as noted above, a cousin of inter partes review, *ex parte* reexamination, 35 U.S.C. § 302 *et seq.*, still bears that name). The name and accompanying procedures suggest that the proceeding offers a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent. Although Congress changed the name from “reexamination” to “review,” nothing convinces us that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.

*Cuozzo*, 136 S. Ct. at 2144; *see also Oil States*, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (“Inter partes \*1361 review is ‘a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent.’” (quoting *Cuozzo*, 136 S. Ct. at 2144)).<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> The legislative history of the AIA confirms that one of the objectives of IPRs was to “revisit and revise” issued patents. *See Cuozzo*, 136 S. Ct. at 2140. In this way, IPRs serve the broader goal of improving patent quality. *See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98*, pt. 1, at 48 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 78 (explaining objective to

“improve patent quality and restore confidence in the presumption of validity that comes with issued patents”).

Moreover, the Supreme Court has described district court challenges, *ex parte* reexaminations, and IPRs as different forms of the same thing—reexamination. *See Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv.*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1860, 204 L.Ed.2d 179 (2019) (“In sum, in the post-AIA world, a patent can be reexamined either in federal court during a defense to an infringement action, in an *ex parte* reexamination by the Patent Office, or in the suite of three post-issuance review proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”). All three serve the purpose of correcting prior agency error of issuing patents that should not have issued in the first place:

Sometimes, though, bad patents slip through. Maybe the invention wasn’t novel, or maybe it was obvious all along, and the patent owner shouldn’t enjoy the special privileges it has received. To remedy these sorts of problems, Congress has long permitted parties to challenge the validity of patent claims in federal court. More recently, Congress has supplemented litigation with various administrative remedies.

*SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu*, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353, 200 L.Ed.2d 695 (2018) (citation omitted); *see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship*, 564 U.S. 91, 96, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 180 L.Ed.2d 131 (2011) (describing district court challenges as an “attempt to prove that the patent never should have issued in the first place”); *Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc.*, 721 F.3d 1330, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that “*ex parte* reexamination is a curative proceeding meant to correct or eliminate erroneously granted patents”).

There are undoubtedly differences between IPRs and their predecessors. This is not surprising given that Congress passed the AIA with post grant review procedures that were intentionally more robust and would provide a “more efficient system for challenging patents that should not have issued.” *See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98*, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011), as reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 69.<sup>18</sup> Celgene is correct that IPRs are “adjudicatory in nature.” *Return Mail*, 139 S. Ct.

at 1860. Among the “adjudicatory characteristics” of IPRs Celgene notes are discovery, briefing, and an oral hearing. *See* Appellant’s Br. 47. But these procedural differences come with the longstanding recognition that “[n]o one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure.” *Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen*, 387 U.S. 556, 563, 87 S.Ct. 1746, 18 L.Ed.2d 954 (1967) (quoting *Ex parte Collett*, 337 U.S. 55, 71, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed. 1207 (1949)). These differences do not disrupt the expectation that patent owners have had for nearly four decades—that patents are open to PTO reconsideration and possible cancelation if it is determined, **\*1362** on the grounds specified in § 311(b), that the patents should not have issued in the first place.

18 Implementing IPRs to create a more robust and efficient system for challenging the validity of patents is not unlike the PTO or Congress making the system more robust by, for example, increasing the budget for or number of examiners in the reexamination unit. While those changes might result in significantly more requests for reexamination and more claims being canceled, we doubt that anyone would argue that they effectuate a taking.

Celgene also argues that statistics show that IPRs have caused a permanent reduction in the value of patents granted before the AIA. *See* Appellants’ Br. 48–49 (citing statistics); Reply Br. 26–27 (citing statistics and arguing that they show that “patents subjected to *inter partes* review have been clobbered in ways previously unimaginable”).<sup>19</sup> But Celgene has made no showing—nor could it—that claims canceled in IPRs, including its own claims, would have fared any better in the preexisting reexamination procedures.

19 Celgene notes that almost as many IPRs were filed and instituted in the first four years after they were created as were filed in the twelve years *inter partes* reexamination were available. Appellant’s Br. 48. This statistic, which merely compares the frequency that these procedures are utilized but does not compare ultimate outcomes, does not sway our analysis.

Recognizing that its patents were also always open to challenge in district court, Celgene attempts to distinguish IPRs from district court proceedings by arguing that while IPRs resemble district court proceedings in some respects,<sup>20</sup> IPRs lack the “same process or rights as civil litigation.” *See* Appellants’ Br. 47–48; Reply Br. 26–27. But the differences that Celgene identifies between district court proceedings and IPRs only serve to demonstrate that IPRs are similar to reexaminations. For example, IPRs use a preponderance

of the evidence burden of proof rather than the district court’s clear and convincing evidence burden of proof. And IPRs, at the time of these proceedings, used the broadest reasonable interpretation for claim construction rather than the narrower standard from *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) used in district court. While these IPR standards differ from those used in district court, they were previously used in *ex parte* and *inter partes* reexamination procedures, as explained above. Celgene also notes that the presumption of validity that applies in district court proceedings, overcome only by clear and convincing evidence, does not apply in IPRs. Reply Br. 26–27. However, the presumption of validity also did not apply in the preexisting reexamination proceedings. *See In re Etter*, 756 F.2d 852, 855–56 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Moreover, we long ago explained that “[w]e do not consider the section 282 presumption [of validity] ... to be a property right subject to the protection of the Constitution.” *Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff*, 758 F.2d 594, 605 (Fed. Cir. 1985), *reh’g granted on other grounds*, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In any event, because Celgene’s patents were granted subject to similar reexamination standards, as discussed above, the differences between IPRs and district court proceedings that Celgene identifies do not create a constitutional issue.

20 That IPRs resemble district court litigation in some ways is in line with one of the objectives of the AIA, which was to provide an alternative to district court litigation. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (describing IPR as a “quick and cost effective alternativ[e] to litigation”); S. Rep. No. 110-259, at 20 (2008) (describing IPR as “a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court litigation”). The fact that IPRs may have shifted some validity challenges from the district court to the PTO does not effectuate a taking.

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the retroactive application of IPR proceedings to pre-AIA patents is not an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Patent owners have always had the expectation that the validity of patents could be challenged in district court. For **\*1363** forty years, patent owners have also had the expectation that the PTO could reconsider the validity of issued patents on particular grounds, applying a preponderance of the evidence standard. Although differences exist between IPRs and their reexamination predecessors, those differences do not outweigh the similarities of purpose and substance and, at least for that reason, do not effectuate a taking of Celgene’s patents.



III

We have considered Celgene's remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. We affirm the Board's determination that all of the claims of the '501 patent and claims 1-9 and 11-32 of the '720 patent are invalid as obvious.

**AFFIRMED**

**All Citations**

931 F.3d 1342

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**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

1. This petition complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(b)(2)(A): This petition contains 3,899 words, excluding the exempted parts of the petition.

2. This petition complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6): This petition has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2018 in 14-point Times New Roman.

Dated: September 27, 2019

/s/ Jihong Lou  
Jihong Lou  
*Counsel for Appellant*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on September 27, 2019, I served a copy of the foregoing on all counsel of record by CM/ECF.

Dated: September 27, 2019

/s/ Jihong Lou  
Jihong Lou  
*Counsel for Appellant*